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PREFACE 
Most United States railroads state that passenger 
service is not a profitable business. These carriers iclaim 
that continued operation of these losing services impairs 
the financial health of the industry. A minority group of 
railroads, however, views passenger service as a desirable 
business activity. These opposing philosophies within the 
railroad industry raise the question of whether passenger 
service is unprofitable or merely unpopular with railroad 
' 
management. 
The pu!pose of this study is to gain some insight into 
reasons why passenger service has been considered a desirable 
activity by a few railroads when the majority of the industry 
believes otherwise. 
This study compares the activities of two similar rail-
roads--the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Inc., 
and the Southern Pacific Company--between 1950 and 1965. The 
two carriers, although similar, differ on the question of 
rail passenger service. The Santa Fe is in favor of such 
service; the Southern Pacific is not. 
It is expected that the conclusions drawn from a study 
of these two carriers can be used to explain differences in 
passenger service policy that exist within the industry at 
large. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this investigation is to gain some 
insight into the reasons why a few American railroads 
choose to continue inter-city passenger service in oppo-
sition to the industry trend toward "freight-only" oper-
ation. What motivates this minority of passenger-oriented 
railroads? 
METHOD 
The focus of this study is an historical-descriptive 
comparison of two relatively similar railroads, The Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company and The Southern Pacific 
Company from 1950 through 1965. This comparison evidences 
why the Santa Fe has appeared optimistic about inter~city 
passenger service while the Southern Pacific has not. 
Because each of these large carriers is a major force 
in the railroad industry, the reasons for Santa Fe's optimism 
and for Southern Pacific's pessimism toward the future of 
inter-city passenger service can be generalized to gain 
insight into passenger service trends in the railroad industry 
at large. 
1 
2 
PROCEDURE 
Santa Fe and Southern Pacific passenger service is 
compared in four data categories: output, revenues, expenses, 
and profitability. Terminology necessary to the interpre-
tation of these data categories is developed as needed. 
The passenger service operations of each railroad from 
1950 tn."'ough 1965 wiil be reviewed in order to determine 
whether the Santa Fe's optimism is supported by passenger 
service profits and whether the Southern Pacific's pessimism 
is backed by passenger service losses. 
A summary of profits and losses, however, does not 
provide much insight into the passenger service policies 
suggested by these data. The profits and losses must be 
explained; they must be linked where possible to comparative 
differences between the two railroads' management policies. 
The significance of passenger service relative to the 
total output--freight and passenger--of each carrier is also 
examined. These explanations of profit and loss are devel-
oped as an integral part of the comparison of Santa Fe and 
Southern Pacific output, revenues, expenses and profitability. 
JUST.IFICATION OF METHOD 
The method used in this study must satisfy three 
particulars: (1) use of a case study, rather than an 
industry study, approach; (2) choice of the Santa Fe and 
Southern Pacific railroads for use in the case study; and 
(3) choice of the 1950-1965 period. 
Case studies. This method was adopted because the 
insights gained into the Santa Fe passenger service policy 
vis-~-vis that of the Southern Pacific can be applied, 
railroad by railroad, to the entire industry if~..!..! 
taken to recognize~ environmental differences between 
other railroads considered~~ particular carriers 
chosen !..Q!:: ~~study. 
3 
An industry-wide study of rail passenger service would 
labor under two major weaknesses: 
First, the question of what firms to include with the 
pro-passenger group and what firms to place in the anti-
passenger group would arise. Each railroad has made a 
commitment to passenger service that is, in some sense, 
unique. This uniqueness is reflected by differences in 
operating conditions, markets served, and in the composition 
of passenger service offered. 
Second, data based on an industry-wide aggregation 
represents, with some cons.iderable bias, an "average" rail-
road, typical of all but representative of none. 1 
Selection of subjects. The Santa Fe and Southern 
1"The more recent statistical costing studies of the 
passenger deficit average the costs from many railroads 
whose traffic densities, operating conditions and cost 
structures are so different that the conclusions are 
worthless." Michael Conant, Railroad Mergers and Abandon-
ments (Berkeley, 1964), p. 133. -
4 
Pacific railroads are similar in many respects that prove 
useful for purposes of comparison. Both traverse essentially 
the same geographical areas and both encounter similar oper-
ating conditions. Both serve essentially the same market 
areas, either directly or by co-ordinated service with 
another railroad (Figures 1 and 2). In 1950, each railroad 
operated modern passenger trains over all major routes. 
The Santa Fe and Southern Pacific differ strongly in 
one important respect: since 1950 the Southern Pacific has 
become increasingly pessimistic about the future of pass-
enger service while the Santa Fe has persisted in its 
optimism. 
In 1956, a Southern Pacific offibial stated, "We 
cannot pretend that the long-term outlook for passenger 
travel by rail is good."2 By 1965, the Southern Pacific 
was " ••• running as few passenger trains as the law would 
permit," and had stated publicly that "1n twenty years 
there will be no transcontinental traina. 11 3 
By contrast, ,in 1957 the Santa Fe Passenger Traffic 
Manager declared that "if some of these other railroads 
could only see what we've seen, they'd realize. that the 
2statement by Southern Pacific Vice President· of. 
Passenger Traffic C.E. Peterson in Railway Age, 150, No. 
25 (October 8, 1956), p. 15 •. 
3statement by Southern Pacific Chairman D.J. Russell 
in Forbes, 96, No. 9 (November 1, 1965), p. 9. 
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FIGURE 1. 
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business is there if they'd only go after it!"4 In 1965, 
this railroad declared "Santa Fe is optimistic about pros-
pects for 1965 passenger sales. The Railway has much to 
se11. 11 5 
Selection of time period. The 1950-1965 era is appro-
priate because it was during this time that a majority of 
7 
railroad managements concluded that passenger service was an 
undesirable product line devoid of any future profit potential. 
In 1950, rail passenger service offered by all major 
railroads had evolved to what might be termed "modern" states 
of technology, equipment and service. Most major service 
was operated by systems having sophisticated traffic control; 
was produced with equipment of recent, streamlined. manufac-
ture; was maintained and repaired in a systematic fashion; 
and consisted typically of "full-service" trains that offered 
Pullman, dining, lounge and coach services. 
In short, 1950 marked the year in which most railroads 
had completed their post-war overhaul of passenger service 
within the bounds of their profit expectations. 
The 1950-1955 period was one of rapid decline in 
passenger train profitability and marked a consequent 
re-evaluation by management of the role passenger service 
4statement by Santa Fa General Passenger Traffic 
Manager R.T. Anderson in Railway Age, 151, No. 34 (Dec-
ember 2, 1957), P• 9. 
5statement by Santa Fe General Passenger Traffic 
Manager Ross E. Chappell in the Santa~ Magazine, (April, 
1965), pp. 2-3. 
might play in the overall economy of the railroad industry 
(Table 1). 
Thie period was one of progressive disenchantment with 
passenger service prospects on the part of management--
8 
a pessimism deepened by management's seeming inability to 
take what it considered the necessary remedial steps. 
Passenger train schedules could be eliminated only by expen-
sive petitions to Sita.ta regulatory authorities. This means 
was often unsuccessful. Most small towns wanted "a pass-
enger train" even if unpatronized, and their voices were 
generally heard and noted by the state commissions involved 
with "train-off" petitions. 
The mid-1950 period was characterized by a final effort 
on the part of railroads to regain their lost passenger 
market. Trains were re-equipped with the latest designs. 
Rail passenger travel was heavily advertised. Numerous 
other resources were devoted to a last try at this market. 6 
More than one large railroad regained passengers with 
expensive promotion campaigns and equipment innovations 
only to find passenger deficits rising--the marginal pass-
enger added more to costs than to revenues. 7 The railr.oad 
industry's renewed confidence in the future of passenger 
6For an extensive summary evaluation see: "Are The 
Passengers Coming Back?", Railway Age, 142, No. 20 (May 
20, 1957), pp. 50-68. 
?Ernest c. Nickerson, "Passenger Losses Must Be 
Controlledo'', Railway Age, 151, No. 23 (September 16, 1957), 
P• 10. 
TABLE 1 
PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE REVENUES AND EXPENSES 
PER PASSENGER TRAIN MILE: CLASS I RAILROADSa 
1940, 1945, and 1950 - 1965 
Revenues Expensesb 
1940 $1 • 51 $1 .86 
1945 4.23 3.25 
1950 3.90 4.83 
1951 4.08 5.48 
1952 4.34 5.72 
1953 -4.25 5.86 
1954 4.14 5.72 
1955 4.24 5.83 
1956 4.42 6.22 
1957 4. 51 6. 51 
1958 4.88 6.66 
1959 5.35 6.98 
1960 5.62 7. 11 
1961 .5.81 1.08 
1962 5.95 7.22 
1963 5~85 7. 21 
1964 5. 91 7.39 
1965 5.59 7.68 
9 
ac1ass I railroads is an Interstate Commerce Commission 
grouping that includes all the major railroads in the United 
States. Class I railroads, for all practical purposes, · 
produce all the rail passenger service in the United Stat·es. 
boirectly-related plus apportioned common expenses. 
Source: Preliminary Abstract of Railway Statistics, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (Washington, 
1950-1953). 
Transport Statistics of the United States, 
Part !--Railroads, Interstate Commerce 
Commleslon, (Washington, 1954-1965). 
10 
service was short-lived. 
By the late 1950's, commercial airlines and the auto-
mobile had made such inroads into the inter-city travel 
market that the long run decline of rail passenger service 
was virtually assured. Rail management opinion solidified· 
with finality. Passenger service was viewed as obsolete 
and no longer desired by the traveling public. The sooner 
this service could be eliminated, the better for all con-
cerned.8 
Viewed as a component of total inter-city passenger 
travel, the decline of rail service is striking. Total 
inter-city travel--by all modes--increased an average 26.9 
billion passenger miles per year between 1950 and 1965. 
However, the railroads' share of this market declined by an 
average of 1.3 billion passenger miles annually. The rail-
roads hauled 6.9 percent of the inter-city passenger market 
in 1950, but only 2.1 percent of the market in 1965 (Table 2). 
Rail management's ultimate weapon for the methodical 
elimination of passenger service was The Transportation 
Act of 1958.9 This legislation gave the railroads a new 
measure of flexibility in the elimination of unprofitable 
train schedules by permitting the carriers to circumvent 
Boavid P. Morgan, ttwho Shot The Passenger Train?", 
Trains, 21, No. 6, (April, 1961), p. 22. 
9Public Law 85~625, 85th Congress. 
TABLE 2 
INTERCITY PASSENGER TRAVEL BY MODE OF TRANSPORT IN PASSENGER MILES 
AND AS PERCENT OF TOTALa, 1950 - 1965 
(in billions of miles) 
To~al · Rail Bus Air 0 Automobile 
miles miles ~ercent miles-12ercent miles~eroent miles p_ercent 
1950 473.0 32.5 6.87 26.4 5.58 1 o. 1 2.14 402.8 85.16 
1951 534.8 35.3 6.60 27.4 5.12 12.9 2.41 457.8 85.60 
1952 575.3 34.7 6.04 28.4 4.94 15.0 2.61 495.5 86.13 
1953 608.8 32.3 5. 31 28.4 4.66 17.4 2.86 529.2 86.93 
1954 625.1 29.5 4.72 25.6 4.10 19.6 3.14 548.8 87.79 
1955 664.5 28.7 4.32 25.5 3.84 22.7 3.42 585.8 88.16 
1956 698.9 28.6 4.10 25.2 3.61 25.5 3.65 617.7 88. 38 
1957 719.2 25.8 3.59 25.0 3.48 28.3 3.93 637.8 88.68 
1958 759.8 23.6 3. 11 20.8 2.74 28.5 3.75 684.9 90.14 
1959 764.7 22.4 2.93 20.4 2.67 32.5 4.25 687.4 89.89 
1960 784.2 21.6 2.75 19.9 2.54 33.9 4.32 706.1 90.04 
1961 790.8 20. 5 2.59 19.7 2.49 34.6 4. 38 713.6 90.24 
1962 817.7 21.2 2.59 21. 3 2.60 37.6 4.60 735.9 90.00 
1963 852.0 18.6 . 2.18 21.9 2.57 42.8 5.02 765.9 89.89 
1964 895.2 18.4 2.04 22.7 2.54 49.5 5.52 801. 8 . 89.57 
1965 940.1 17.6 1 .87 23.3 2.48 58.1 6.17 838.1 89.17 
apercentages will not total to 100 each year due to rounding and omission of Irilarid 
waterway travel data. 
brncludes private aircraft. 
Source: In~erstate Qomm~rce Commission Statement 580 (Washington, January 1958). 
Statistical Abstract of United States, U.S. Government Printing Office 
(Washington, 1967). ~ .... 
12 
state regulatory authorities when desired.10 
In retrospect, the sixteen year period of 1950 through 
1965 encompasses a marked decline of passenger train service 
interrupted only briefly by a short-lived and expensive 
· resurgence of unwarranted optimism during 1956-1957 that 
served only to solidify the final industry consensus. Only 
a few railroads dared to resist the trend. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
This study, like any other, is constrained by the 
nature and availability of its data. Although these limita-
tions are discussed in detail as the data are presented, a 
general overall view of these constraints is useful to the 
reader at the beginning. This overview of data sources and 
nature affords the reader a perspective of the practical 
boundaries within which this investigation has necessarily 
had to proceed. 
Only incomplete statistical data on passenger service 
output and revenues is available directly from both the Santa 
Fe and Southern Pacific railroads. No really useful expense 
data has been provided--publicly or privately--by these roads. 
For the sake of consistency, it has been necessary to rely 
upon Interstate Commerce Commission data as the primary 
10Among other things, this legislation permitted the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to hear "train-off" petitions 
in either an original or an appelate capacity. For a summary 
discussion see: Machael Conant, Railroad Mergers~ Abandon-
ments, (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 158-160. 
13 
source. 
Interstate Commerce Commission data used has been 
drawn from both published annual statistical summaries and 
unpublished data on file at the Commission. This latter 
source is required from the railroads by law but is not 
published in its original form by the Commission for public 
distribution. 
Information concerning management policies has been 
collected from industry trade journals; company magazines, 
correspondence and interviews with railroad officials: rail-
road time tables; private correspondence and observations 
of the author. 
Data and meaningful cooperation extended the author 
directly by the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific have been 
meagre. Similarily, published policy statements by rail-
road officials are scarce--at least those with details and 
particulars in sufficient degree to be useful in this 
study. 
Consequently, the discussion of this study of passenger 
service management policy is, by necessity, concerned mainly 
with the observed results of policy action rather than with 
public policy statements (although such statements are 
analyzed). It is the action, not the formal verbalizing, 
that warrants study, attention, and discussion in this 
treatise. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MEASUREMENT OF PASSENGER SERVICE OUTPUT 
Much of the apparatus of microeconomic theory is based 
upon observed relationships between revenues and costs of 
production (as dependent variables), and output (the inde-
pendent variable). In a general-case theoretical model, the 
simple concept of "an output unit" is sufficient. 
Investigation of the revenues and the costs of a given 
firm, however, must proceed with the firm's output unit 
explicitly and carefully defined. Specifically, what is the 
nature of rail passenger service output? Can this output be 
usefully quantified with a single (homogeneous) measure, or 
must several different measures be used? Finally, what out-
put measures are available--and what are the advantages of 
each? 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the various. 
passenger service output units used in this study. These 
units must be practical (in the sense that they conform to 
available data) as well as theoretically applicable. This 
dual requirement necessitates both a careful description of 
the available output units and the presentation of a schema 
of economic theory that will embrace these available rail 
passenger service output units. 
14 
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THE NATURE OF RAILROAD OUTPUT 
Early writers. Economists have pondered the nature of 
railroad output for many years. M.O. Lorenz attempted 
early in this century to relate railway cost behavior to 
railway output. He decided that, 
We are obviously handicapped by the lack of 
a homogeneous unit of service. A net ton of coal 
cannot be compared with a net ton of excelsior, 
and a oar of coal containing 50 tons cannot be 
compared with a car containing 10 tons of house-
hold goods.1 
Lorenz believed that railroads produced many different 
outputs, and that these outputs could not be compared 
(they were heterogeneous). He suggested, however, that 
11 
••• the gross ton mile is ••• the nearest comparable unit 
of service that we have. 11 2 
Lorenz also found that, in practice, 
Practically no expenses can be traced to a 
particular shipment. Some can be traced to 
large classes of traffic, such as the coal 
traffic, or to separate trains; and still more 
can be traced to the freight traffic as a whole 
and, finally, some cannot be traced at all.3 
The disagreement between A.C. Pigou and Frank Taussig 
over the cause of differential pricing by railroads was 
1M.O. Lorenz, "Cost and Value of Service in Railroad 
Rate Making," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 30 (1919), 
pp. 215-216. 
2rbid. · 
3M.O. Lorenz, "Constant and variable Railroad Expend-
itures and the Distance Tariff,'' ibid., 21 ( 1907), p. 283 
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really a disagreement about the nature of railroad output. 4 
Pigou asserted that railroads produced a single, homogeneous 
commodity--ton miles--and.the cause of differential railroad 
rates was an example of discriminatory pricing by railroad 
monopoly.5 
Taussig argued that railroad output was a varied 
collection of different services produced in joint supply. 
Joint supply requires that the production of one good 
necessarily result in the production of another good. If 
railroads produced in joint supply, differential rates 
would prevail even under conditions of pure competition. 6 
Pigou attacked Taussig's notion that railroads 
produced output in joint supply. Pigou believed that the 
mere presence of unallocatable expenses does not imply 
joint production and joint cost.7 Pigou could grant 
Taussig that railroads produced more than one type of 
output (a departure from his original position) and still 
retain the heart of his monopoly discrimination argument. 
Pigou accepted common cost, but not joint cost {except 
4A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, {4th ed., 
London, 1950), Chaters XVII and XVIII; F.w. Taussig, 
"Railway Rates and Joint Cost Once More," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 27 (1913), p. 378.; and F.W. 
Taussig with A.C. P1gou, "Railway Rates and Joint Cost," 
ibid., pp. 535 and 687. 
5Allyn Young, ttpigou' s Wealth and Welfare," Quarterly 
.Journal of Economics, 27 {1913), p. 681n. 
6F.W. Taussig, "Railway Rates and Joint Cost Once 
More," ibid., p. 381. 
7 A. C. Pigou, "Railway Rates and Joint Cost," ibid., 
p~ 690. . 
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for the minor case of backhaul of empty cars to loading 
point). 
J.M. Clark and Lorenz joined with Pigou in criticizing 
Taussig's joint-output thesis. Clark asked, 
Does the taking of an extra hundred thousand 
tons of freight contribute toward facilitating 
the taking on of extra passengers in the same way 
that killing an added hundred steers for the sake 
of the meat contributes toward the production of 
more hides and other by-products?~ 
Lorenz expresses a similar argument by stating that, 
if the running of passenger trains interfered with the 
running of additional freight trains, the passenger service 
was not a jointly-produced by-product.9 
These early writers on the subject of railroad output 
agreed that railroads produced a variety of different 
outputs. Furthermore, most authors believed the ton-mile 
to be a useful single output measure, even though these 
various outputs were not strictly comparable. 
Comtemporary writers. Walter Isard defines the 
output unit as a "transportation input;'' that is, the 
movement of a " ••• unit weight over a unit distance ••• the 
exertions of effort and other factor services required to 
overcome resistance encountered in movement through space 
where friction is present. 11 10 Isard is content to use 
. 8 J.M. Clark, The Economics of Overhead~' (Chicago 
1923), p. 255. ~ 
91orenz, p. 283. 
10Walter Isard, Location~ Space-Economy, (New York 
1956), p. 79. 
ton-miles when dealing with aggregates and specific ton-
miles when considering a specific line of production.11 
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Ford K. Edwards, a student of J.M. Clark and a pioneer 
of modern railway cost-finding procedures, believes that 
railroad output may have "many dimensions" and the use of a 
single measure, such as ton miles, ls inadequate.12 Edwards 
expresses these output dimensions in terms of "performance 
units" such as gross ton miles, locomotive miles, car miles, 
and train speed and asserts that each of these performance 
units represents a "reasonably homogeneous measure of work 
performed. 11 13 
In 1951, Barger asked, "is the ton mile, the carload, 
a combination of these, or some different measure to be taken 
as the fundamental unit of service? 11 14 He believed that 
although railroad output was probably homogeneous in a 
physical sense, various outputs were not comparable because 
of differences in the demand of these various outputs. 
George w. Wilson clarified Barger's statement by arguing 
that transportation output consists of comparable (homogen-
eous) ton-miles mixed with various combinations of service 
11 Ibid., p. 79n. 
12Ford K. Edwards, "Cost Analysis in Transportation," 
American Economic Review, 37 (1947), p. 443. 
13Ibid., p. 443n. 
14Harold Barger, The Transportation Industries, 1889-1946, 
(New York, 1951), p. 17o':'° 
''extras" such as speed, flexibility, safety, and depend-
ability. 15 
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Milne argues that the unit of supply, the "transport 
unit", will differ from the unit of demand, "the individual 
passenger and the individual consignment. 1116 Troxel concurs 
in stating, "Indeed, the organization of transport opera-
tions is not much embraced in ton or ton-mile, passenger-
mile, or even load units. 111 7 The output to be 11 costed" is 
measured with a different yardstick than the output to be 
"priced." G. Lloyd Wilson agrees with Milne that the "supply 
unit" and the "sales unit" will differ. 18 
An additional characteristic of railroad output is its 
intangible nature. The product is a service; no inventory 
can be held by the firm. Isard states that, "perhaps the 
most salient feature of a transport input ls its momentary 
character. 111 9 This feature of rail output is especially 
significant when one attempts to determine unit cost with 
conventional cost accounting procedures. This problem will 
be discussed in the subsequent chapter that deals with the 
15George w. Wilson, "On the Output Unit in Transport," 
Land Economics, 35 (1959), p. 271. 
16A.M. Milne, The Economics of Inland Transport, 
(London, 1955), p. 125. 
l7Emery Troxel, Economics of Transport, {New York, 
1955), pp. 93-94. ~ 
. 18G. Lloyd Wilson, Economics£! Transport, {New York, 
1955), p. 268. 
19rsard, p. 89. 
nature of railroad expenses. 
Summary of output characteristics. In a physical 
sense, the production of transportation requires work: 
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weight is moved over distance through 11.!!• The quantity 
supplied of transportation output is related to the cost of 
providing the basic ton-mile unit plus the costs of service 
extras such as speed, careful handling, ease of on-and-off 
loading, dependability, and other "extra packaging" neces-
sary to haul a given commodity by rail in competition with 
other modes of transport. 
The quantity demanded of transportation output can be 
similarily construed. Quantity demanded is composed of a 
basic ton-mile unit plus some combination of service extras 
as mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
Within this context, transportation output units--on 
both the demand and supply sides of the market--are each a 
combination of: (a) a homogeneous ton-mile unit and (b} 
some heterogeneous combination of service extras. 20 
INADEQUACY OF A SINGLE OUTPUT UNIT 
If rail output were composed of only weight and time 
elements, a single unit of measure for this output would be 
20Ton-miles, though a homogeneous unit in a physical 
sense may not be strictly comparable as an output unit to 
which costs are to be assigned. 11 ••• a gross ton mile of 
a lightly loading commodity probably represents a more 
costly service than a gross ton mile of a heavy commodity." 
M.O. Lorenz, "Cost and Value of Service in Railroad Rate 
Making," ibid., pp. 215-216. 
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acceptable. When one recognizes output elements such as 
speed and other service extras (air conditioning for the 
passenger and a cushion underframe car for fragile freight), 
the simple ton-mile is not sufficient to quantify the "many 
dimensions" of this rail output. Indeed, no single measure 
can usefully aggregate all these dimensions. 
This historical-descriptive comparison of the Santa Fe 
and Southern Pacific passenger operations uses several output 
measures. The major dimensions of each carrier's passenger 
service output are traced and compared, one at a time, with 
the expectation that each different output measure will 
provide some insight for the reader that would not be afforded 
by one of the other particular output comparisons. 
AVAILABLE OUTPUT MEASURES 
Numerous output measures are used by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 21 The major output units deemed useful 
for this particular study are: 
Passenger train miles. This unit quantifies the 
annual total miles operated by passenger trains. Weight or 
speed elements are not included in this unit. The type of 
passenger train (mail, express, local, or luxury passenger) 
is likewise ignored by this measure. 
Passenger train gross .12!!-miles. This statistic 
combines the elements of weight and distance. It measures 
21Transport Statistics of the United States,~ I--
Railroads, (Washington, n.c.-;-1950-1965). 
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the annual number of gross tons (weight of train and contents) 
carried one mile. Speed elements are not included in this 
unit measure. 
Average passenger train speed. If all passenger trains 
had operated at an identical schedule speed during a given 
year, this statistic would express that speed. Since it is 
a mean average, it reduces to a common denominator both the 
high speed, limited-stop, through train and the slow, multi-
stop, local mail, express, and day-coach train. 
The three output measures just introduced (when used as 
a group) provide some form of comparability of the major 
dimensions of passenger train output. 
Additional insight into the characteristics of each 
carrier's passenger service is possible by the addition of 
several supplementary descriptive measures: 
Average number of.£!!!:.! per train. This statistic is 
useful as an indication of the composition of passenger 
train service. In this study, the average number of cars 
per train is further divided between passenger-carrying and· 
mall-express cars. 
~assengers carried. This measure denotes the annual 
number of revenue passengers carried. There is no available 
measure which divides this statistic between first-class and 
coach passengers. 
Average passenger Journey. This arithmetic mean is an 
indicator of the degree to which the railroad concerned is 
involved with long-haul passenger service, as opposed to 
23 
local operations. 
Revenue Rassen~er miles. This unit can be viewed as 
quantifying the annual number of revenue passengers carried 
one mile. 
Freight service measures. If the passenger service of 
each railroad were studied in isolation from the carrier's 
freight operation, a distorted comparison would be the 
result. Passenger service is not produced in a vacuum by 
·the railroad; it is a part of an overall scheme of transpor-
tation service, freighti and passenger. As such, passenger 
service must be viewed as a component of the railroad's 
total output. Viewing passenger service relative to the 
carrier's total output enables the reader to assess whether 
passenger service is a major output of the firm or merely a 
by-product. 
Similarly, freight service output measures similar to 
those just discussed for passenger service are used as an 
aid in the development of the relative importance of pass-
enger service. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Railroad output is in the form of a service. This 
service is intangible and there can be no inventory of this 
output on hand. Furthermore, this service has many dimensions: 
weight, distance, time, and various combinations of service 
extras (extra "packaging"). Indeed, a railroad produces many 
different services. Some are produced jointly with others, 
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but most of these different services are produced with some 
common (not joint) inputs. 
Because this output_ has many dimensions, a single unit 
measure of output is insufficient to interpret all but the 
most general studies of revenues and expenses. 
Rail passenger service is a broadly defined output. 
Some of its elements are essentially homogeneous, that is, 
some elements of Santa Fe passenger service are comparable 
with Southern Pacific passenger service. These elements are 
quantified by the unit measures of passenger train miles, 
passenger train gross ton-miles, and average passenger train 
speed. 
Some dimensions of rail passenger service are not 
homogeneous. Santa Fe and Southern Pacific passenger train 
output, for example, might each contain identical outputs of 
passenger train miles, gross ton-miles, and passenger train 
speed, but at the same time, in reality be an altogether 
different quality of output. One railroad could produce 
mostly mail train service, while the other might emphasize 
the hauling of passengers. 
Because passenger service output is heterogeneous in 
some of its dimensions (as noted in the preceding paragraph), 
several subsidiary output measures must be also used in 
addition to the physically homogeneous units of passenger 
train miles, gross ton-miles and passenger train speed. 
These subsidiary measures include average number of cars per 
train (divided between passenger-carrying and other types), 
average passenger journey, revenue passengers hauled, and 
revenue passenger miles. 
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Although not directly a passenger service output unit, 
the relative importance of passenger service to the carrier's 
total output (freight and passenger) is yet another dimen-
sion of passenger service. Therefore, freight service out-
put measures similar to those used to quantify passenger 
service are used for the purpose of illustrating the rela-
tive importance of each railroad's passenger service. 
CHAPTER. III 
THE EVOLUTION OF PASSENGER TRAIN OUTPUT: 
A COMPARISON OF THE SANTA FE RAILWAY 
AND THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY 
FROM 1950 TO 1965 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace ·and describe 
the passenger train output of both carriers over time. This 
comparison is necessary for two reasons. First, the increas-
ingly divergent passenger service policies of the two rail-
roads are reflected, in degree, by the evolution of the out-
put of each. Second, a detailed record of both carriers' 
1950-1965 passenger train output is a necessary foundation 
for the study of their costs, revenues and management pol-
icies contained in subsequent chapters. 
By 1950 both the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific had 
equipped their major passenger schedules with light-weight, 
streamlined equipment. Both railroads served the Chicago-
California, New Orleans-California, and the intra-California 
markets--either directly, or through coordinated service 
with a connecting carrier. Each was competitive with the 
other in terms of schedule time, fares, and composition of 
service offered. Both carriers' streamliners offered 
(typically) extensive Pullman, lounge, and dining service 
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in addition to the conventional coach space. 
Each carrier also offered numerous non-streamlined 
and/or local schedules. The Santa Fe's output of this type 
was in widely dispersed, light patronage, branch ~1ne trains 
in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico. Southern Pacific 
service of this type was more concentrated in its northern 
California commuter trains. Both railroads also operated 
non-streamlined "secondary" trains (mostly devoted to 
hauling mail and express) over their long-haul routes. 
In 1950, the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific pass-
enger operations were dissimilar in only two major respects. 
First, and apart from the "feeder" services supplied to 
every carrier from every other carrier, the Santa Fe opera-
tion was essentially self-contained and depended upon no 
other carrier for support in its passenger service. The 
Southern Pacific, on the other hand, operated Chicago-
California service on a coordinated basis with the Rock 
Island and the Union Pacific railroads. Second, the 
Southern Pacific company operated commuter service which 
was, however, a minor component of passenger train miles 
in 1950. 
By 1965, Santa Fe passenger service differed substan-
tially from the Southern Pacific's. The Santa Fe had elimi~ 
nated most branch-line operations, had streamlined all its 
remaining passenger service and was promoting its output in 
an agressive fashion. The Santa Fe had re-equipped its 
first-line trains twice since 1950 and continued to maintain 
the quality of service on all major routes~ 1 
The Southern Pacific, in contrast, had all but 
abandoned its New Orleans-California service (coaches-
only east of El Paso), had downgraded its Chicago-Cali-
fornia trains (by eliminating most lounge and dining 
service), and had discontinued major parts of its intra-
California service. The only new passenger equipment of 
consequence purchased by the Southern Pacific after the 
early fifties was for its commuter service. 
In short, by 1965 the Santa Fe had moved toward a 
long-haul passenger-oriented railroad, while the Southern 
Pacific had become disinterested in passenger service in 
general and long-haul service in particular. Furthermore, 
the Southern Pacific's increasing passenger service bias 
toward commuters indicates the road's inability to pursue 
phase-out decisions in this local service to the same ex-
tent as in the long-haul operations.2 
1santa Fe President E.S. Marsh stated in 1964 that 
"we have emuhasized our transcontinental service with some 
new equipment and with the rehabilitation of some older 
equipment--and we are promoting, in every way we know how, 
to attract more passenger business for that service." 
Railway Age, 150, No. 25 (December 28, 1964), p. 26. 
2southern Pacific President B.F. Biaggini stated in 
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1967 that "the long distance passenger train has lost its 
purpose in the light of every evident public preference for 
other modes. Gradually, since 1954, by discontinuing as 
many unused trains as the regulatory bodies would permit, 
and by tailoring other features of the service to fit the 
steadily declining demand, we have been able to reduce our 
passenger deficit. Commuter services still meet a need and 
must be continued, even though they run at substantial losses. 
Southern Pacific operates this type of losing service south 
along the San Francisco Peninsula." Railway Age, 162, No. 21 
(May 29, 1967), p. 57. 
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PASSENGER TRAIN OUTPUT 
Both carriers' output in passenger train miles has 
declined since 1950. Figure 3 traces the·evolution of this 
output measure and shows that the Santa Fe produced more 
passenger train miles in 1950 than the Southern Pacific and 
decreased this output at a slower rate than its competitor. 
Furthermore, this Santa Fe output has nearly stabilized at 
a high level relative to the Southern Pacific since 1960. 
The fall in Santa Fe passenger train miles during 1965 was 
caused by flood damage that disrupted service over major 
parts of its midwestern lines. 
Much the same output trends are apparent in the evolu-
tion of each company's passenger train gross ton miles (GTM). 
The Santa Fe has nearly .stabilized its gross ton miles since 
1958 by consolidating major Chicago-California trains during 
seasons of slack demand.3 Figure 4 shows that Santa Fe GTM 
trended downward at a slower pace than the Southern Pacific 
output. Comparison of Figures 3 and 4 shows that by either 
output measure, the Santa Fe has chosen to substantially 
3santa Fe President E.S. Marsh comments that, "in the 
summer we'll run pretty much to capacity. During the fall 
we consolidate our Suhar Chief (all-pullman) and~ Capitan (all-coach), reduce t e consists and run them as one train 
with one crew and one engine. However, we maintain the 
integrity of the service. Each part has its own dining and 
lounge facilities and for all practical purposes the people 
on one part don't know the others are on the same train. 
But every day we do that we save 4,454 passenger-train miles 
because that is the round-trip distance for one train to Los 
Angeles and back (to Chicago)." Railway Age, 150, No. 25 
(December 28, 1964), p. 26. 
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maintain output levels in contrast to the rapid decline of 
Southern Pacific passenger train service. 
The output decline of each carrier is generally the 
,. 
result of cut-backs in local and branch line service. The 
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nature of this decline is suggesteu by the increasing average 
passenger train speed of each carrier shown in Figure 5. The 
average Southern Pacific train speed is biased downward to 
some·extent by the company's commuter operations. 4 
COMPOSITION OF PASSENGER TRAIN OUTPUT 
Table 3 shows, for each carrier, the composition of 
the "average passenger train", divided between those cars 
devoted to carrying passengers and those "head-end" cars 
used to carry mail, baggage, express and so forth. Note 
that while the average Santa Fe train has grown in car 
length since 1950, the average Southern Pacific train is 
about the same length in 1965 as in 1950. This indicates 
that while both carriers reduced passenger train miles over 
time, the Santa Fe accomplished this by consolidating trains 
during periods of slack demand instead of eliminating the 
train schedules entirely (as has been Southern Pacific prac-
tice). 
Also, the Santa Fe has tended to supply a consistent 
average of six passenger-carrying cars per train between 
1950 and 1965 while the Southern Pacific has reduced such 
4see page 37 for a discussion of the significance of 
Southern Pacific commuter operations. 
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1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
.TABLE 3 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CARS PER PASSENGER TRAIN 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
Tota:["' Passen5er-carryin5 
Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe .Pacific 
10.95 13.40 5.85 9.05 
10.93 13.40 5.90 8.82 
11. 33 13. 70 5.98 9.08 
11. 28 13.60 5.83 8.24 
11.23 13.50 5.75 7.86 
11. 66 14.40 5.80 7. 31 
11. 80 14.20 5.87 7.32 
11. 77 13. 50 5.67 1.00 
12.07 13.80 5.56 7.24 
12.70 14. 20 5.88 7.19 
13. 10 13. 70 5.91 6.62 
13. 32 14.00 6. 10 6.88 
13.32 14. 10 6. 11 6.82 
13. 37 13. 70 6.12 6.61 
13.32 13. 30 6.01 6.40 
1 3. 41 13. 10 6.oo 6.76 
*Component data may not agree-with total due to rounding. 
- -- tteaa..:eiid 
Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific 
5.10 4.35 
5.03 4.58 
5.35 4.62 
5.45 5.26 
5.48 5.64 
5.86 1.09 
5.93 6.88 
6. 10 6.50 
6.51 6.56 
6.82 1.01 
7.19 1.08 
. . 1 .22 1.12 
7.21 1. 28 
7.25 1.09 
7.25 6.90 
7.41 6.34 
Source: Annual Report .2! The Atchison, Topeka,.!!!!! Santa Fe Railway~ 12 !h! 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (Washington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid., !h! Southern Pacific Company. vi ~ 
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cars from a high of nine to slightly more than six and one-
half (Table 3). Furthermore, the Southern Pacific statistic 
is biased upward by the increasingly important commuter ser-
vice of this railroad. 
The number of head-end cars per average passenger 
train has tended to increase over time for both carriers. 
In the case of Santa Fe, this addition lengthened the average 
train. For the Southern Pacific, the increase only offset a 
decline in the number of passenger-carrying cars per train.5 
Further information about the composition of each car-
rier's passenger service is available from the distribution 
of passenger train revenue among the various categories 
shown in Table 4. Both the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific 
have experienced a relative substitution of head-end revenue 
for passenger revenue. 
Conceivably, everything now transported by passenger 
trains could be moved in freight service with one exception: 
passengers. How has the passenger component of each car-
rier's passenger trains changed since 1950? How effectively 
have these passenger facilities been utilized? 
5santa Fe and Southern Pacific public timetables 
(1950-1965) that list the equipment consist of each schedule 
indicate that Santa Fe has maintained Pullman, dining, and 
lounge oar service on those trains retained while Southern 
Pacific has increasingly eliminated Pullman service and 
substituted a single unit lounge-vending machine oar for 
previous two-unit lounge-dining car service on most trains. 
S.!!!!:!: Fe 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE REVENUES 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950 - 1965 (percent) 
Passen5er Mail Express Dinin5 ~Otlier 
48.9 34.1 1.1 6.6 2.7 
49.5 27.7 13. 1 7.3 2.4 
46.8 33.8 10.4 6.2 2.8 
45.1 36.1 9.8 6.1 2.9 
Total Revenues 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Southern Pacific 
1950 56.2 23.3 7.6 8.6 3.3 100.0 
1955 55.0 22.4 11 • 6 7.9 3.1 100.0 
1960 51.9 30. 2 8.6 6.3 3.0 100.0 
1965 47.9 37.1 6.7 5.0 3.3 100.0 
Source: Annual Report .2! ~ Atchison, Topeka,~ Santa .f.! Railway £..2..!. 1£ I!!! 
Interstate CQmmeroe Qommi~slcm, (Washington, 1950-1965). · 
Ibid.,~ Southern Pacific Company. \.,,I 0\ 
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Since 1950, both carriers have decreased the number of 
passenger-carrying cars in service. The decline of these 
units on the Santa Fe has not been as rapid as on the South-
ern Pacific.6 In addition, the average number of seats per 
Santa Fe car decreased from 57.4 in 1950 to 49.3 in 1965. 
During the same period, average seats per Southern Pacific 
car increased from 64.1 t.o 74.6 (Table 5). The Santa Fe 
trend in seats per car reflects the carrier's move away from 
high-capacity seating toward the roomier, long-distance 
equipment. The Southern Pacific's move toward greater car 
capacity is influenced by a number of bi-level high capacity 
commuter cars used in short-haul service as well as the elim-
ination of many lounge and dining cars with few seats per car. 
PASSENGER SERVICE LOAD FACTORS 
While the Santa Fe has consistently hauled fewer pass-
engers per year than the Southern Pacific, it has carried the 
average passenger farther. Table 6 shows that even the non-
commuter Southern Pacific passenger traveled a shorter aver-
age journey than his Santa Fe counterpart. With fewer 
6santa Fe's passenger-carrying cars declined from 582 
in 1950 to 436 in 1965, a decrease of 25 percent. Southern 
Pacific's passenger-carrying car fleet shrunk from 757 in 
1950 to 308 in 1965, a decline of 51 percent. Transport 
Statistics of the United States, Part !--Railroads, Inter-
state Commerce-aommission, (Washington7 D.C., 1950-1965). 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Source: 
TABLE 5 
UTILIZATION OF PASSENGER-CARRYING EQUIPMENT 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
Average trainload 
{people) 
Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific 
79.6 123.0 
91.5 134.9 
99.9 138. 9 
88. 1 123.6 
88.5 115. 6 
91.0 128 .o 
93.8 127. 4 
88.9 117.6 
97.8 1 21 . 7 
104.o 125.8 
108.8 122.5 
114. 7 125.2 
114. 3 124.9 
108.8 11 5. 1 
114.o 11 2. 7 
116.4 118. 4 
Average carload 
(seats). 
Santa Southern 
Fe · Pacific 
13. 6 13. 6 
15.5 15.3 
16.7 15. 3 
1 5. 1 15.0 
15.4 14.7 
15.7 17.5 
16.0 17.4 
15.7 16.8 
17.6 16.8 
17. 7 17. 5 
18.4 18.5 
18.8 18.2 
18.7 18.3 
17.8 17.4 
18.8 17.6 
19.4 17.5 
Capacity of 
average car 
Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific 
57.4 -64.1 
55.7 65.1 
54.6 63.6 
52.6 63.4 
50.9 62.7 
52.0 63.2 
51.8 61. 7 
49.7 67.0· 
49.6 66.o 
49.4 62.3 
50.4 62.3 
. 49.8 60 .1 
49.6 69.0 
49.7 68. 5 
50. 2 69.6 
49.3 74.6 
Average titilization 
percent of capacity 
Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific 
23. 7 26.8 
27.8 29.2 
30. 6 "30. 7 
28.7 28.2 
30. 3 27.1 
"30. 2 27.7 
"3(). 9 "3(). 5 
31.6 29.1 
35.5 "30. 3 
35.8 32.9 
36.5 33.1 
37.8 31. 3 
37.7 29. 9 · 
35.8 29.8 
37. 4 "30. 2 
39.4 28.2 
Annual Report of The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa E.!!, Railway£.£:.!!£ The 
Interstate Commerc:e Cqmml sslon, (Washington, 1950-1965). · 
Ibid., !h! Southern Pacific Company. \J,I co 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE PASSENGER JOURNEY IN MILES 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
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Southern Pacific Southern Pacific 
Santa Faa excluding commutersb including commuters 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1 961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
520. t 4 
562.16 
565.37 
564.61 
565.57 
570. 73 
620. 57 
629.02 
621.80 
639. 11 
668.77 
693.58 
698.25 
682.29 
683.00 
713.43 
464.32 
491.45 
470.76 
442.56 
468. 14 
476. 40 
502. 14 
521.64 
514.06 
569.82 
570. 1 3 
606.45 
743. 70 
662.15 
642.45 
611.76 
179.52 
189.71 
110.54 
154.93 
144.81 
144. 31 
144.89 
137 .04 
1 35. 1 3 
138. 32 
135. 77 
1 39. 57 
143.79 
1 31. 46 
115.63 
103.08 
asanta Fe does not operate commuter service. 
bThis unpublished data furnished by L.G. Crocket, Passenger 
Traffic Manager, Southern Pacific Company. 
Source: Annual Report of The Atchison, ToReka, !,lli! 
Santa Fe Railway Co. to The Interstate 
Commerce Commiseioii';" Twashington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid., The Southern Pacific Company. 
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passengers, the Santa Fe, by hauling them farther, was able 
to stabilize its passenger miles to a great degree after 
1960 (Figures 6 and 7). 
Not only does the Santa Fe passenger output trend 
diverge from that of the Southern Pacific, but available 
load factors are more favorable for the former carrier than 
for the latter. 
Between 1950 and 1965, the Santa Fe's average train-
load has risen from 79.6 to 116.4 passengers. Its average 
carload has increased from 13.6 to 19.4 passengers during 
this time, pulling up its load factor (seats filled as a per-
cent of total seats available) from 23.7 percent to 39.4 per-
cent. 
During this same period, the Southern Pacific's average 
trainload of passengers declined considerably from 123.0 to 
118.4, causing the Southern Pacific's passenger car load fac-
tor to increase modestly from 26.8 percent in 1950 to 28.2 
percent in 1965 (Table 5). 
The Santa Fe has been able to fill its available pass-
enger space more completely (and at the same time evolve more 
roomy long distance equipment) than has the Southern Pacific 
(which trended toward more local-service equipment with many 
more seats per.car). 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUTER SERVICE 
Throughout this chapter, there have been occasional 
references to Southern Pacific's commuter operation. This 
Revenue 14 
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Ibid., !h!, Southern Pacific Company. 
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Source: Annual Re~ort of The Atchison, Topeka, and 
Santa Fe ailway Cc>. to The Interstate~ 
Commerce Commission, Twaiii'Ington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid.,~ Southern Pacific Company. 
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passenger-only short-haul output has surely biased the car-
rier's per-trip load factors upward and its average passenger 
journey downward. The extent of this bias cannot be accur-
ately determined by recourse to published data, however, 
available statistics do provide some insight into the magni-
tude of commuter service relative to Southern Pacific's 
total passenger operations. 
Table 7 shows that while 55.7 percent of the total 
revenue passengers in 1950 were commuters, commuter trains 
accounted for only 7.1 percent of Southern Pacific's total 
passenger train miles. By 1965, when commuters made up 76.5 
percent of Southern Pacific's revenue passengers, commuter 
train miles were only 18.1 percent of total passenger train 
miles. 
The increasing importance of Southern Pacific commuter 
traffic relative to its long-haul trains does not invalidate 
comparisons between this carrier and the long-haul Santa Fe 
passenger service. Because the Southern Pacific has evolved 
to its present state by concentrating on commuter service 
(over which it has little power to eliminate) at the expense 
of previously important long-haul service, comparisons 
between this carrier and the Santa Fe may prove to be highly 
meaningfµl. 
PASSENGER SERVICE RELATIVE TO TOTAL OUTPUT 
The output measures discussed above are meaningless 
until they are located as a relative part of each railroad's 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Source: 
TABLE 7 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY COMMUTER SERVICE 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL PASSENGER 
SERVICE, 1950 - 1965 
Percent of total 
passenger train miles 
1.1 
6.8 
7.5 
9.1 
10.6 
10.9 
11 .o 
11. 7 
12.0 
12.0 
12.3 
12.2 
12.2 
13. 6 
15.9 
18. 1 
Percent of total 
revenue passengers 
55.7 
55.7 
56.2 
60.0 
65.8 
64.2 
64.4 
65.9 
67.8 
69.2 
69.7 
10.1 
72.8 
74.o 
75.6 
76.5 
Interstate Commerce Commiss1on5 Revenue Traffic, EQ!:!! .Q§.:J2 (Washington, 1950-19 o,. 
Ibid., EQ!:!! ~ (Washington, 1961-1965). 
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total rail output. Only when passenger service ls viewed as 
a component of total service can it be Judged more--or less--
a byproduct operation; its economic Justification lies in 
extracting more output from an under-utilized physical plant. 
If, however, the operation of passenger trains accounts for a 
significant portion of the railroad's total output (for 
instance, when passenger trains begin to interfere with the 
operation of freight trains), their Justification becomes 
more exacting. In this sense, they must generate a return 
more commensurate with the profitability of freight opera-
tions. 
Passenger service~§ percent of total output. This 
comparison of Santa Fe and Southern Pacific passenger ser-
vice shows the following differences (Table 8): 
a) Santa Fe passenger service was 40 percent of total 
train miles in 1950 and 32 percent in 1965--a decrease in 
this percentage of 22.5 percent. 
b) Southern Pacific passenger service was 34 percent 
of total train miles in 1950, but only 14 percent in 1965--
a decrease in this percentage of 59 percent. 
c) Santa Fe passenger service was 23 percent of total 
gross ton miles in 1950 and 14 percent in 1965--a decrease 
in this percentage of 39.2 percent. 
d) Southern Pacific passenger service was 18 percent 
of total gross ton miles in 1950 and 5 percent in 1965--a 
decrease in this percentage of 72.3 percent. 
3) Santa Fe passenger service was 27 percent of total 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 8 
PASSENGER SERVICE OUTPUT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL RAILROAD OUTPUT 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
Passenger f;rain miles ·a:ross ton mTres ··~ -Passenger~triln~servfce~~hoursa 
Santa Southern Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
40 
40 
40 
40 
41 
39 
40 
39 
37 
38 
33 
34 
34 
34 
33 
31 
34 
33 
32 
31 
31 
27 
27 
27 
26 
23 
23 
20 
1 9 
18 
16 
14 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
21 
21 
19 
17 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
15 
14 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
12 
12 
11 
11 
10 
9 
9 
8 
8 
7 
5 
27 
27 
27 
28 
29 
25 
25 
24 
23 
20 
20 
20 
20 
21 
20 
19 
19 
19 
18 
17 . 
18 
16 
15 
16 
15 
14 
14 
14 
13 . 
13 
12 
9 
airrain service hours ls an output statistic that shows the product of---C-a) the number of 
passenger and freight trains put together and operated per year and (b) the number of 
hours elapsed running time of each of these trains. 
Source:· Annual Report of The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co. to The 
Interstate Comiiier~Commlsslon, (Washington, 1950:-f965). ~ ~ ~ 
Ibid., The Southern Pacific Company. +>" 0\ 
train service hours in 1950 and 19 percent in 1965--a 
decrease in this percentage of 29.7 percent. 
f) Southern Pacific passenger service was 19 percent 
47 
of total train service hours in 1950 and 9 percent in 1965--
a decrease in this percentage of 52.6 percent. 
Although both railroads' passenger service decreased 
in importance relative to total output, Santa Fe's service 
was consistently more important than Southern Pacific's. In 
addition, the Santa Fe's passenger service decreased in 
importance at a slower rate than the Southern Pacific's--in 
all three categories. 
Comparison of freight service. A comparison of Santa 
Fe and Southern Pacific freight service output is useful in 
the sense that the performance of each carrier's freight 
operation may well set standards against which passenger 
service performance is judged. Three output measures have 
been developed from published Interstate Commerce Commission 
data and are tabulated in Table 9. 
Two major differences are revealed by Table 9. First, 
the Santa Fe tends to operate lighter freight trains than 
the Southern Pacific. This implies that the average freight 
train speed is somewhat higher on the former road than on 
the latter. It implies that the Santa Fe is geared, in its 
operations, to a higher overall train speed (freight and pass-
enger) than the Southern Pacific.? To the extent this is true, 
7santa Fe's average freight train speed increased from 
TABLE 9 
SELECTED FREIGHT SERVICE OUTPUT DATA: SANTA FE AND 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
Average freight train · · ~Average freight oar L.C.L.a as percent of 
tonna5e journey t miles l total frei5ht tonnage 
Santa Southern Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
1950 1 , 011 1 ,080 517 446 0.1 o.8 
1951 1 ,035 1 , 1 38 517 441 0.7 0.7 
1952 1,054 1, 167 515 445 0.7 0.7 
1953 1 ,048 1 , 152 54o 434 o.6 0.6 
1954 1 ,081 1 , 181 513 446 o.6 0.5 
1955 1 , 114 1, 196 535 453 o.6 0.6 
1956 1,147 1, 252 523 435 0.5 0.4 
1957 1, 1 ~7 1, 289 553 438 0.5 0.4 
1958 1 ,249 1, 309 528 451 o.4 0.3 
1959 1, 142 1, 337 547 479 o.4 0.2 
1960 1 , 190 1, 368 · 561 475 0.3 0.2 
1961 1, 272 1, 361 544 474 0.4 0.2 
1962 1, 272 1 ,402 551 501 0.3 0.2 
1963 1, 314 1 ,424 568 492 0.2 0. 1 
1964 1, 320 1,475 575 498 0.2 0. 1 
1965 1, 335 1,512 573 501 0.2 0. 1 
aL.C.L. denotes less~than-carload freight. 
Source: Preliminary Abstract of Railway Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington, 1950-1953T. 
Transport Statistics of the United States, Part !--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Twaihington, 1954-1965r:--- -
~ 
CX> 
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fast passenger trains would interfere less with the effi-
cient operation of freight trains. Most railroad men dream 
of a truly "one-speed" railroad:• a. railroad where both freight 
and passenger trains operate at the same scheduled speed in 
mainline service. 8 
The second comparative difference between Santa Fe and 
Southern Pacific freight service is that the Santa Fe average 
freight car journey is consistently greater than that of the 
Southern Pacific. Not only in passenger service, but in 
freight service as well, the Santa Fe is the ulong haulu of 
the two railroads studied. 
Table 9 also summarizes the less-than-carload (L.C.L.) 
freight hauled by each carrier from 1950 through 1965. This 
type of traffic is a negligible fraction of each railroad's· 
total freight tonnage (less than one percent of the total for 
all years). Both railroads have hauled less and less of this 
class of freight since 1950, but the Southern Pacific has 
decreased this service to a greater extent than has the Santa 
Fe. Although L.C.L. tonnage is handled in freight trains, it 
is similar in nature to express tonnage carried in passenger 
service. For this reason, a road's move away from L.C~L. ton-
nage might also indicate a willingness to eliminate express. 
20.5 to 27.1 miles per hour between 1950 and 1965. Southern 
Pacific's average freight train speed increased from 16.6 to 
24.7 miles per hour during this period. Transport Statistics 
1!!. .!:h! ~. ~ I--Railroads, (Washington, D.C., 1950-1965). 
8 Personal interview with Kelly Fogg, Assis-
tant to the President, Santa Fe Railway, Dallas, Texas, October 
6, 1967. 
50 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although the Southern Pacific has been involved with 
commuter service for many years, it and .the Santa Fe were 
essentially equals in the long-haul passenger business in 
1950. Over time, this similarity diminished, and today, no 
longer exists. By 1965, the Southern Pacific was, for all 
practical purposes, out of the long-haul passenger train 
business. Its remaining long-haul service was heavily 
oriented to head-end business. The averages of Southern 
Pacific's passenger-carrying statistics were biased upward 
by the road's highly localized commuter traffic. 
The Santa Fe in 1965, while less passenger-oriented 
than 1n 1950, was still very much in the long-haul passenger 
business. Stripped to the essentials of its main-line 
passenger service, the Santa Fe continued in 1965 to supply 
passenger train output along its major routes in amounts that 
had been essentially stabilized since the 1958-1960 period. 
In comparing the two carriers' freight service output, 
the Santa Fe tended towards shorter, faster, and longer-haul 
trains than its rival the Southern Pacific. This trend 
indicates that fast passenger service would interfere less 
with freight train operation on the Santa Fe than on the 
Southern Pacific. The differential between passenger train 
and freight train speed-would be less in the Santa Fe oper-
ations than in those of the Southern Pacific. 
Passenger service output on the Santa Fe has been a 
larger fraction of total output than has been the case on 
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the Southern Pacific (although this fraction has decreased 
over time on both railroads). If one assumes that both 
carriers were equally able to discontinue non-commuter pass-
enger service as they desired to do so, passenger service is 
a more essential component of management's output plans on 
the Santa Fe than on the Southern Pacific. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF PASSENGER AND ALLIED.SERVICE REVENUES: 
A COMPARISON OF THE SANTA FE RAILWAY 
AND THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY 
FROM 1950 TO 1965 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the nature 
of passenger and allied service revenue for both carriers 
between 1950 and 1965. This presentation and analysis is 
g~ouped into two general categories: (a) total passenger and 
allied service revenue and the composition of this nonfreight 
revenue and (b) per-unit revenue breakdowns. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
"Passenger and Allied Service Revenue" measures the 
gross revenue derived from the operation of passenger train 
service. P.& A.S. revenue, for the purposes of this study, 
is divided between tthead-end" revenue and ''passenger-
related" revenue. Head-end revenue is the sum of "baggage", 
"mail", "express", and "other" categories of P.& A.S. rev-
enue. Passenger•related revenue is the total of "dining and 
buffet", "parlor and club", and "passenger revenue" •. This 
arbitrary, two-part allocation divides P.& A.S. revenue 
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between operations directly associated with the hauling of 
passengers and operations not directly related to the hauling 
of passengers but usually produced in conjunction with pass-
enger business. 
REVENUE TOTALS AND COMPOSITION 
Between 1950 and 1965, Santa Fe P.& A.S. revenue de-
clined from $92 million to $86 million and decreased from 
18 percent to 13 percent of the road's total operating rev-
enue (Table 10). Southern Pacific P.& A.S. revenue decreased 
from $84 million in 1950 to $44 million in 1965 and shrunk 
from 14 percent to 6 percent of this carrier's total oper-
ating revenue (Table 11). 
In other words, between 1950 and 1965, the dollar P.& A.S. 
Santa Fe revenue decreased 6.5 percent while Southern Pacific 
P.& A.S. revenue shrunk 48 percent. 
In addition, Santa Fe P.& A.S. revenue was nearly stable 
after 1954 both in dollar terms and as a percent of total 
1 operating revenue. In contrast, Southern Pacific P.& A.S. 
1 
"The reason for this, in a nutshell, is longer trains, 
double-level cars and some heads-up railroading. Longer 
trains with a greater number of paying passengers per train, 
along with a rather substantial decrease in train miles 
because of the discontinuance of a great many short runs, 
branch line trains and intermediate runs no longer used by 
travelers are the basic Santa Fe realities in this area. We 
handled about $86 million worth of passenger train business 
in 1963--compared with $83.3 million in 1954--despite a one-
third reduction in passenger train miles." Statement by E. 
S. Marsh, Santa Fe President, Railway Age 150 No. 25 (Dec-
ember 28, 1964), p. 26. · 
TABLE 10 
COMPOSITION OF PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE REVENUE 
SANTA FE RAILROAD, 1950 - 1965 
- ~Passenger and Allied-S-ervice Head-end,a Passen5er-relatedD 
. percent -of percent of percent or 
ULl_OOO) all revenue (x 1000) P.& A.S. (x 1000) ·~···~ P.& A.S. 
1950 $ 91,655 17.54 $39,351 42.93 $52, 304 57.07 · 
1951 94, 603 16.58 33,082 34.97 61, 521 65.03 
1952 102,687 16.99 35,384 34.46 67, 303 65.54 
1953 92,386 15.06 33,881 36.67 58, 505 63.33 
1954 84,795 15.93 33,736 39.79 51 ,059 60.21 
1955 84,328 14.59 34,894 41.39 49,434 58.61 
1956 87, 606 14.84 34,904 39.84 52, 70~ 60.16 
1957 83,533 12.45 33,985 40.68 49,548 59.32 
1958 81, 502 13.69 34, 180 41. 74 47,482 58.26 
1959 85,615 13. 51 38, 303 44.74 47,313 55.26 
1960 85,544 13. 93 38,061 44.49 47,483 55.51 
1961 87,332 14.45 39,186 44.85 48, 146 55.13 
1962 89,893 14.68 40,867 45.46 49,026 . 54.54 
1963 87,442 14.19 40,781 46.64 46,661 53.36 
1964 88,350 13.85 40,411 45.74 47, 939 54.26 
1965 86,352 13. 19 40,052 46.38 46,300 53.62 
asum of P.& A.S. revenue categories: mail, express, baggage, milk, and other. 
bsum of P.& A.S. revenue categories: Passenger, parlor and club, dining and buffet. 
Source: Preliminari Abstract of Railway Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
{Washington, 1950-1 95;f. 
Transport Statistics of the United States, Part I--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Twashington, 1954-1965,.-- - \J1 ~ 
· 1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 11 
COMPOSITION OF PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE REVENUE 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD, 1950 - 1965 
Passenger and-Allied Service Head-enda - - - - -Pass-eri5er-refatedD 
percent .of percent of percent of 
(x 1000} all revenue ,x 1000} P.& A.S. (x 1000} P.& A.S. 
$83,673 13. 99 $27 ,038 32.31 $56,635 67.69 
88,953 13. 73 25,543 28.72 63,410 71. 28 
92,656 13. 23 29, 161 31.47 63,495 68.53 
83, 283 12.03 27,756 33.33 55,527 66.67 
72,940 11. 65 24,463 33.54 48,477 66.46 
68,548 10.28 23, 711 34.59 44,837 65 .. 41 
66,159 9.75 22,333 33.76 4 3,826 66.24 
61, 424 9.26 21,498 35.00 39,926 65.00 
58,922 9.08 21, 503 36.49 37,419 63. 51 
59,440 8.61 23,689 39.85 35,751 60.15 
57 ,038 8.56 22,381 39.24 34,657 60.16 
56,996 8.45 23,054 40.45 33,942 59.55 
58, 353 8. 31 24,255 41. 57 34,098 58.43 
53,571 7.60 24,536 45.80 29,035 54.20 
50, 181 6.89 23,698 47.23 26,483 52.77 
43,835 5.57 19,337 44.11 24,498 55.89 
Asum of P.& A.S. revenue categories: mall, express, baggage, milk, and -other. 
bsum of P.& A.S. revenue categories: passenger, parlor and club, dining a.nd buffet. 
Source: Preliminarz Abstract of Railwa~ Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington, 1950-1953T. 
Transport Statistics of the United States, Part !--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Twaihington, 1954-1965r:-- - \J1 \J1 
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revenue, while remaining fairly steady in dollar terms after 
1958-1959, became progressively less important as a percent 
of total operating revenue (Figure 8). 
~-!!!!! revenue. Between 1950 and 1965, Santa Fe's 
head-end revenue increased modestly in dollar terms from 
$39 million to $40 million. However, this revenue increased 
in importance as a compenent, from 43 percent to 46 percent, 
of P.& A.S. revenue (Table 10). 
Over the same period, Southern Pacific's head-end gross 
decreased from $27 million to $19 million, but moved from 
32 percent to 44 percent of the road's P.& A.S. revenue 
(Table 11). 
Increases in mall rates and express charges between 
1950 and 1965 contributed to Santa Fe's modest increase in 
head-end revenue but were a retarding influence upon Southern 
Pacific's decreasing head-end gross. ~xpress rates were in-
creased 15 percent in 1953; mall rates were raised 10 percent 
in 1954, 7.5 percent in 1955, and 13 percent in 1960. 2 
Passenger-related revenue. Between 1950 and 1965, Santa 
Fe's passenger-related revenue decreased from $52 million to 
$45 million, or a decline of 11.5 percent (Table 10). Southern 
Pacific passenger-related revenue was cut from $57 million to 
$24 million, a decrease of 66.7 percent (Table 11). Over 
this time, Santa Fe's passenger-related gross decreased from 
57 percent of P.& A.S. revenue to 54 percent while Southern 
2Moody's Transportation Manual, (New York~ 1966), pp. 
a73-a74. 
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Source: Preliminary Abstract 2f. Railway Statistics, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (Washington, 
1950-1953). 
Transport Statistics of~ United States, 
Part r~-Railroads, Interstate Commerce 
Commission, (Washington, 1954-1965). 
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Pacific's declined from 68 percent to 56 percent. 
Increases in passenger fares during the 1950-1965 per-
iod exerted·a retarding influence on the declining passenger-
related revenues of both carriers. In 1951, a 10 percent 
increase was posted and 5 percent increases were made in 
1956, 1957, 1958 and 1961. 3 
SALES EFFORTS 
Extra charges. In the early 1950's, the Santa Fe and 
the Southern Pacific both imposed an extra charge on the 
passengers riding "flagship" trains such as Santa Fe's Super 
Chief, El Capitan, and Chief and Southern Pacific's Sunset 
Limited and Golden State Limited. In 1954, the Santa Fe 
eliminated this surcharge on the Chief in an attempt to 
attract more business. At the same time, the extra charge 
on the Super Chief and!!, Capitan was reduoed. 4 
The Southern Pacific,· however, has retained this extra 
charge on both its trains mentioned above. In 1965, pass-
engers were required to pay a ten dollar surcharge to ride 
the coach-only Sunset Limited, a train that had no diner 
or lounge. 5 
Travel incentive plans. Between 1950 and 1965, the 
3Ibid. 
4sixtieth Annual Report to Stockholders, (The Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Year ended December 31, 
1954), p. 14.' 
5public Timetable of Passenger Train Schedules. (The 
Southern Pacific Company'; 1965), p. 4. 
59 
Santa Fe has offered special reduced rates for families 
traveling together and has gradually expanded this plan to 
include departure on any day _of the week. Reduced-cost 
bargain meal plans are also available in the diner. Credit 
cards are accepted and a "pay-later" plan has been offered 
since 1960. 6 In addition, scenic "stop-over 11 tours are 
offered at points of interest along the line. 
Beginning in 1964, the Santa Fe offered special passenger 
fares to all points on round-trip travel between September 15 
and April 15 that amounted to approximately 14o percent of 
the one-way ticket. This represented a saving of around 20 
percent from the regular round-trip fare.7 
The Southern Pacific, in contrast, ceased to honor 
credit cards in 1961 and has no family plan. There is no 
dining service left to promote. The Southern Pacific offers 
no reduced rates. 
Special equipment. In the early 1950's the Santa Fe 
re-equipped its major passenger trains with modern, stream-
lined equipment, complete with dome cars, diners, and lounges. 
The Southern Pacific equipped its trains initially in the 
same period with modern, streamlined equipment, but not dome 
611 our surveys indicate that a large proportion of the 
Pay Later business is generated by passengers who would not 
otherwise have traveled by rail." Sixty-Sixth Annual Report 
!:.Q Stockholders, (The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail-
way Company, Year ended December 31, 1960), p. 9. 
?public Timetable of Train Schedules (Ticket Agent 
Edition), (The Atchison-;-Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Com-
pany, 1 964) , p. 1 O • 
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oars. In 1956, the Santa Fe developed a new concept in long-
distance coach travel for use on their n Capitan. These 
oars, known as "high-level'' equipment, were an immediate suc-
cess in service. The passenger rode some seven feet higher 
off the rails, providing a better view, less noise, and more 
comfort. With no increase in car length over the previous 
designs and only slightly more weight per car, the Santa Fe 
increased the per-car seating from forty eight to seventy two 
persons and maintained the roomy seating arrangements. 8 
After a year's operation by these high-level cars, !1!!.!1-
way Age reported that 
Santa Fe's high-level El Capitan is held in 
something approaching awe by many passenger of-
ficers, and from what it's doing to the Santa Fe 
passenger revenue, it should be. The double-
deck version of that always popular coach train 
was responsible for about $1,900,000 of the Santa 
Fe's $2.8 million increase in passenger revenue 
last year. The new train has increased revenues 
to roughly three times what they were with the 
former equinment--with little or no increase in 
net operating cost. During the train's first 
summer, the Santa Fe had a daily waiting list of 
119 to 190 persons.~ 
The Southern Pacific continued to operate with its 
original--and conventional--streamlined equipment and began 
selling airline tickets in its on-line offices. 
Advertising efforts. Both railroads devoted a signifi-
cant percentage of their 1950 advertising budgets to the 
8The Official Railway Equipment Register, (New York, 1961) 
pp. 1-~ . 
9"Are the Passengers Coming Back?", Railway Age, 142, 
No. 20 (May 20, 1957), P• 68. 
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promotion of passenger service. The Santa Fe spent $1.9 
million, or nearly 83 percent of its advertising budget, on 
selling this service. The Southern Pacific allocated a less-
er a.mount, $1.1 million, but nearly 93 percent of its adver-
tising funds, to this effort (Table 12). 
Each carrier's passenger advertising began to decrease 
during the middle of the 1950 decade, both in dollar terms 
and as a percent of each road's total advertising budget. 
Here the similarity ends. 
The dollar decline of Santa Fe's passenger advertising 
was modest in comparison to Southern Pacific's cuts. The 
declining importance of Santa Fe passenger advertising rela-
tive to the total budget was due largely to the fact that 
this road's total spending of this type was on the increase 
with the added dollars going to promote freight service. 
Not only did Southern Pacific passenger advertising 
decline in both dollar and percentage amounts, but the total 
dollar advertising budget of this road was cut. 
By 1965, when Santa Fe's passenger advertising was $1.5 
million and 57 percent of the road's total advertising bud-
get, the Southern Pacific's passenger advertising had decreased 
to $51 thousand, and only 10 percent of the carrier's spend-
ing of this type (Table 12). 
It appears from the data in Table 12 that the Santa Fe 
believes in advertising its services--both freight and pass-
enger--while the Southern Pacific does little of either. A 
preliminary conclusion might be that if the public doesn't 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
.1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 12 
TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENSE AND AMOUNT ALLOCATED TO PASSENGER AND 
ALLIED SERVICE OPERATIONS, SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
Total amount AlTocated to P.& A.S. Percent of total 
~ x 1000} ( x 1000} { x 1000} 
Santa Southern Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
$ 2, 355 $1 , 221 $1 , 951 $1, 131 82.8 92.6 
3,095 1, 26 3 2,663 1 , 160 86.o 91.8 
3,083 1, 537 2,629 1,163 85.3 75.7 
3,423 1, 575 2,158 1 , 179 63.0 74.9 
3, 011 1, 334 2,507 1 ,089 83.3 81. 6 
3,076 1, 520 2,290 895 74.4 58.9 
2,773 1, 548 2,166 781 78. 1 50. 5 
2,651 914 1, 934 456 73.0 49.9 
2, 411 870 1, 574 401 65.3 46.1 
3,027 804 1, 997 470 66.0 58.5 
2,981 767 1, 950 339 65.4 44.2 
2,956 533 1, 84 3 231 62.3 43.3 
3,159 540 2,052 188 65.0 34.8 
2,891 520 1, 978 100 68.4 19.3 
3,020 521 2,083 Bo 69.0 15.4 
2,596 504 1, 485 51 57.2 10. 1 
Source: Annual Report of The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co. to The 
Interstate Comiiier~Commission, (Washington, 195o=T965). ~ ~ ~ 
Ibid., The Southern Pacific Company. 
0\ 
I\) 
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know the trains exist, they will not be patronized. For 
lack of patronage and the resulting deficit, Southern Pacific 
can claim that the public no longer desires passenger trains. 
SUMMARY OF TOTAL REVENUE DATA 
Both Santa Fe and Southern Pacific total Passenger and 
Allied Service Revenue have decreased between 1950 and 1965. 
The decrease, however, was less rapid on the Santa Fe than 
on the Southern Pacific (Figure 8). In fact, Santa Fe's 
P.& A.S. revenue total has remained remarkably steady since 
1954. Figure 8 shows that the real divergence between 
Santa Fe and Southern Pacific revenues began in 1954. 
The divergence between the two roads' total P.& A.S. 
revenues after 1954 can be traced mainly to a decline in 
Southern Pacific's passenger-related revenue, since head-
end revenue for both carriers remained essentially constant 
in dollar terms between 1950 and 1965. 
The stability of Santa Fe's passenger-related revenue 
between 1954 and 1965 can be traced partly to this railroad's 
sales efforts. Attractive equipment innovation, travel in-
centive plans, and advertising represent the major compon-
ents of this promotion. 
The rapid decline in Southern Pacific passenger-related 
revenue over this time can similarily be associated with an 
absence of sales promotion. The lack of advertising coupled 
with a deterioration in both the quantity and quality of 
Southern Pacific's service brought about this result. 
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PER UNIT PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE REVENUE 
~ passenger train.!!!..!.!.!• The Southern Pacific has 
consistently generated more P.& A.S. revenue per passenger 
train mile than the Santa Fe. In 1950, Southern Pacific 
grossed $4.64 to the Santa Fe's $3.88 and in 1965, the 
figures were $6.51 and $6.08 respectively (Figure 9). Fig-
ure 9 suggests that the Santa Fe was more flexible in ad-
justing passenger train miles to the demand for this service 
than was the Southern Pacific during periods of seasonal, 
cyclical or secular decreases in demand (when seats and 
baggage cars would run empty} by reducing passenger train 
miles quickly. The comparatively smooth upward trend for 
the Santa Fe, shown in Figure 9, reflects the elimination of 
passenger train miles that were not patronized by passengers 
or needed for head-end service. In addition, the Santa Fe 
has, since 1958, consolidated some main line trains during 
the slack season which causes a seasonal decrease in train 
miles and increases the revenue per passenger train mile as 
the revenue is concentrated over fewer output units. 
~ gross ton !!!!l!• In 1950, the Southern Pacific gross-
ed 3.61 cents to Santa Fe's 3.29 cents per gross ton mile, 
while in 1965, the figures were 5.43 and 4.28 cents respec-
tively (Figure 10). 
Between 1950 and 1965, the Santa Fe consistently earned 
less revenue per gross ton mile than the Southern Pacific 
{Figure 10). At the same time, both carriers have improved 
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their position steadily since 1955. The Santa Fe's com-
paratively poor showing is caused by two major factors: 
first, the Santa Fe runs more "non-revenue" cars, such as 
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lounges and diners, than does the Southern Pacific; sec-
ond, while the Santa Fe consolidates some trains during the 
off-season, gross ton miles do not fall at the same rate as 
passenger train miles since the remaining trains have a few 
more cars than usual. Because the Southern Pacific tends to 
eliminate schedules rather than consolidate them with other 
runs, Southern Pacific GTM and passenger train m1les tend to 
change at similar rates. 
Earnings per~ trip. Table 13 is the result of an 
attempt to estimate the per-trip passenger train gross car 
earnings. 10 An estimate was made both for passenger-carry-
ing cars and for head-end cars, as well as an average of 
the two general car types. In all three categories, for 
every year under consideration, the Santa Fe was estimated 
10Per-car-trip revenue was estimated in the following 
fashion. Total passenger-related revenue was determined. 
This statistic was multiplied by an estimate of average num-
ber of passengers per passenger-carrying car (which ls the 
"load factor" referred to in Table 13). The result was per-
car-trip revenue for passenger-carrying cars. The product 
of this statistic and the average number of passenger-carry-
ing cars per passenger train depicted the passenger-related 
revenue per passenger train trip. This statistic was then 
divided into total passenger-related earnings to isolate an 
estimate for the number of passenger trains operated per 
year (actual train departures). This statistic was then div-
ided into the total head-end revenue to determine an estimate 
for head-end revenue per-average-train trip. The result was 
divided by the average number of head-end cars per passenger 
train to arrive at average per-trip head-end car revenue. 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 13 
ESTIMATE* OF AVERAGE PER-TRIP CAR EARNINGS FOR SANTA FE 
AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
Passen5er-carrying car HeacI-end car Average car-both types 
Santa Southern Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
$196.66 
242.58 
264.53 
239. 18 
228.23 
227.96 
264.16 
275.69 
312.05 
319.49 
345. 92 
370. 17 
376.81 
350.48 
361.15 
387.61 
$78.78 
95.00 
90.09 
78.04 
67.32 
67. 20 
74.45 
75.08 
77.40 
80.77 
80.96 
76 .14 
89. 20 
77.72 
71 .40 
98.27 
$169.72 
153.01 
155.45 
148.17 
158.23 
159.26 
173.18 
175.77 
191.85 
223.00 
227.92 
254.55 
266.18 
258.57 
254.89 
271. 50 
$78.25 
73.70 
81. 32 
61 • 11 
47.34 
36.64 
40. 36 
43.54 
49.09 
54.89 
48.89 
49.97 
59.44 
61. 2.3 
59.26 
82. 71 
$184.11 
201. 36 
213.02 
195.21 
194.07 
193.43 
218.44 
223.90 
247.22 
267.67 
281. 15 
307. 50 
316.93 
300. 64 
303. 31 
323.45 
$78.61 
87.72 
87.13 
71.44 
58. 97 
52.15 
57.94 
59.89 
63.94 
68.oo 
64. 39 
62.83 
73.83 
69.19 
65. 10 
90.74 
*Load factors ( average passenger car-loadTused in compiling above estimates taken from: 
Ely M. Brandes and Alan E. Lazar, The Future of Rall Passenger Traffic in the West, (Stan-
ford Research Institute Project 567oT, (Stanford°Research Institute, Menl0Park-;-T'967). 
Source: Preliminary Abstract of Railway Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
[Washington, 1950-1953T. 
Transport Statistics of the United States; Part I--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Twashington, 1954-19 5r:--- -
0\ (X) 
69 
to gross considerably more revenue per car trip than the 
Southern Pacific. Carta.inly the Southern Pacific commuter 
service, with its short hauls and underutilized equipment, 
would strongly bias these estimates. This bias, however, 
would have been minor in 1950 when commuter service was only 
seven percent of total passenger train miles. 
Most Southern Pacific commuter cars in 1965 were bi-
level, high-density seating oars. At any rate, commuter 
service would not bias head-end earnings per car trip as 
seriously as it would bias passenger-carrying car trip earn-
ings since commuter passenger trains operate only negligible 
head-end equipment. However, the estimates show no better 
results in the Southern Pacific's head-end revenues (Table 
13). Unfortunately, there was no available revenue data 
that separated commuter earnings from other passenger train 
earnings. 
Earnings per train trip. When the appropriate estimates 
in Table 13 are multiplied by the statistic "average number 
of cars per passenger train" for the relevant year, the 
result is an estimate of passenger and allied service rev-
enues (gross) per passenger train trip (Figure 11). In 
other words, if every train (of each carrier that operated 
during a given year grossed an amount identical to every 
other train operated, the resulting amount would be that 
graphed in Figure 11. 
Passenger and allied service revenue per passenger train 
trip increased, on the Santa Fe, from $2,016 in 1950 to 
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$4,337 in 1965. The comparable Southern Pacific estimates 
are $1,053 and $1,188 respectively (Figure 11). The increas-
ingly significant bias of commuter service in the Southern 
Pacific data since 1950 is offset, as mentioned above, by 
high-capacity cars. Unfortunately, the data necessary to 
estimate this bias is not available. The Santa Fe per-
formance pictured by Figure 11 is explained by the reason 
that it operates more cars per train. 
Passenger-related revenue per passenger. The data sum-
marized in Figure 12 illustrates each railroad's attitude 
toward hauling passengers. The Santa Fe has increased its 
per-passenger revenue in this category nearly every year 
over the 1950-1965 span. The Southern Pacific passenger-
related revenue per passenger has held almost steady over 
this time at a dollar amount considerably less than that 
earned by the Santa Fe. 
This difference in revenue between the two roads is 
influenced by two factors. First, the average passenger 
journey is considerably greater on the Santa Fe than on the 
Southern Pacific. The average passenger's basic fare would 
be greater for this reason. Second, being on the train over 
a greater distance, the average Santa Fe passenger would tend 
to make additional expenditures for Pullman space, meals in 
the diner, and drinks in the lounge car. As this luxury-
type service has been eliminated by the Southern Pacific, the 
passenger on that carrier has increasingly been left with 
little else to do but purchase his coach ticket and remain 
$ 
19 
17 
15 
1 3 
11 
9 
7 
5 
3 
0 
lf'\ 
0\ 
Santa Fe 
/ 
-------~ Southern Pacific 
lf'\ 
lf'\ 
O'I 
...... ...... 
FIGURE 12. 
lf'\ 
\() 
O'I 
...... 
PASSENGER-RELATED* REVENUE PER PASSENGER: 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
72 
*Passenger Related Revenue was obtained by subtracting 
mail, baggage, express and the category "other" revenue 
from total Passenger and Allied Service Revenue. 
Source: Preliminary Abstract .Q! Railway Statistics, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (Washington, 
1950-1953). 
Transport Statistics of the United States, 
Part I - Railroads, Interstate Commerce 
Commission, (Washington, 1954-1965). 
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in his seat. The evolving significance of commuter service 
on the Southern Pacific railroad after 1950 is also basic to 
comparative differences pictured by Figure 12. 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FREIGHT REVENUES 
Total operating revenue. Between 1950 and 1965, Santa 
Fe total gross operating revenue (freight plus passenger) 
increased from $523 million to $655 million, a growth of 
20.2 percent. Over the same period, the Southern Pacific 
total rose from $598 million to $786 million, an increase of 
23.9 percent {Table 14). Southern Pacific's total gross 
operating revenue was greater than Santa Fe's every year 
during this period except 1957 •. 
Freight!!.!!:. operating income. Net income from freight 
service is calculated by subtracting operating expenses 
( including apportioned common expenses), net rents, and 
accrued taxes from operating revenue. 
Between 1950 and 1965, Santa Fe's net increased a modest 
1.2 percent (from $101 million to nearly $103 million) where-
as Southern Pacific's n.et decreased 12 percent ( from $96 
million to nearly 385 million). In addition, Santa Fe's net 
from freight service was greater than Southern Pacific's for 
all years during this period except 1952 and 1960 (Table 14). 
In other words, Santa Fe freight service grossed less, but 
netted more, revenue than the Southern Pacific's freight ser-
vice for most years spanned by this study. 
Revenue per freight train~· Although the key to an 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Source: 
TABLE 14 
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE AND NET INCOME FROM FREIGHT SERVICE 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
Total operating revenue Freight net railway 
(freight and passenger) operating income 
Santa Fe 
'x 1000} 
Southern Pacific Santa Fe 
(x 1000} 
Southern.Pacffic 
$522,676 $598,263 $101, 300 $ 96,250 
570, 582 647,671 108,085 106, 300 
604, 512 700,359 100, 287 115, 385 
613, 531 692,085 117,183 110,455 
532,292 626,215 110,317 106,186 
578,034 666,920 114,631 107,525 
590, 183 678,325 117,811 104,013 
670,714 663,493 109,568 105,113 
595, 289 648,814 103, 4 32 93, 392 
633,836 690,316 96,119 91, 634 
614,017 666,632 81, 390 85,345 
604, 524 674,813 79, 389 77,288 
612,320 701 ,879 87,763 76,708 
616,080 704,488 92,593 88, 370 
637,772 728, 578 98,364 76,268 
654,704 786,296 102,891 84,718 
Preliminari Abstract of Railwaz Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington, 1950-1953'· 
Transport Statistics of the United States, Part !--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, '{washington, 1954-1965Y:-- - --3 
.p--
75 
Explanation of the comparative differences in total freight 
net revenue lies with a comparison of freight service expenses 
(to be discussed in a subsequent chapter), per-unit freight 
revenue measures give some indication of why Santa Fe's 
freight service net income was higher than Southern Pacific's 
for most years. 
Table 15 indicates that between 1950 and 1965, gross 
freight revenue per freight train mile increased 19.6 per-
cent on the Santa Fe (from $14.31 to $17.79). Southern 
Pacific's gross per freight train mile increased a lesser 
amount, 13.8 percent, during this period (from $14.65 to 
$16.99). 
Average revenue per ton of freight. Gross freight 
revenue per ton of freight hauled decreased for both Santa 
Fe and Southern Pacific between 1950 and 1965. (Table 15). 
Over this time, Santa Fe revenue declined 6.3 percent (from 
1.42 cents to 1.33 cents) while Southern Pacific revenue 
shrunk 5.2 percent (from 1.36 cents to 1.29 cents per mile). 
However, Table 15 shows that Santa Fe per-ton revenue was 
greater than Southern Pacific's for all years studied. 
Summary .Q.f freight revenue. In terms of total operating 
revenues the Santa Fe generally lags behind the Southern 
Pacific for all years studied. Positions of the two roads 
are reversed, however, with net income from freight service. 
Here the Santa Fe's net eclipsed the Southern Pacific's for 
most years over the 1950-1965 period. During a 1950-1965 
decline in Southern Pacific's net from freight service, Santa 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
· 1963 
1964 
1965 
Source: 
TABLE 15 
SELECTED PER-UNIT FREIGHT SERVICE REVENUE 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
Freight revenue per freTght Average revenue per 
train mile ton of frei5ht 
Santa Fe Southern Pacific Santa Fe Southern Pacific 
$14.31 $14.65 1.42¢ 1. 36¢ 
14.72 15.64 1.42 1. 37 
15.96 16.88 1. 51 1.45 
16.55 17 .04 1. 58 1.48 
16.26 16. 31 1. 50 1. 38 
16.18 16.46 1. 45 1. 38 
16.63 17.53 1. 45 1 .4o 
17.79 18.72 1. 52 1. 45 
18.85 19.02 1 • 51 1. 45 
16.95 18.77 1.48 1.4o 
16.66 18.84 1. 4o 1. 38 
17.73 18.91 1. 40 1. 38 
17.82 18.76 1. 41 1. 34 
17.96 16.05 1. 38 1. 31 
17. Bo 16. 21 1. 35 1. 28 
17.79 16.99 1. 33 1. 29 
Preliminary Abstract of Railway Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington, 1950-1953}. · 
Transport Statistics of the United States, Part !--Railroads, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Twashington, 1954-1965-Y-:-- - · -.J o, 
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Fe was able to post a modest increase. 
Per-unit measures of gross freight revenue tend to sup-
port the net income figures. Southern Pacific Gross revenue 
per freight train mile was larger than the Santa Fe's for all 
years except for the last three years studied. This is traced 
to the longer Southern Pacific freight trains discussed in 
Chapter III. However, Santa Fe's per-ton gross revenue (in 
freight service) is higher than the Southern Pacific's for 
all years studied. The shorter, faster trains that gross 
high per-ton revenue make more money for the Santa Fe than 
the long, slow trains of lower average rate commodities oper-
ated by the Southern Pacific. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
"Passenger and Allied Service Revenue" denotes the 
gross revenue derived from the operation of passenger train 
service. For this study, P.& A.S. revenue is divided into 
two categories. 
"Passenger-related'' revenue estimates the gross receipts 
generated from carrying, feeding, and entertaining passengers. 
"Head-end" revenue estimates the gross receipts from 
carrying mail, baggage, express, and other miscellaneous 
articles. The sum of "head-end" and "passenger-related" rev-
enue equals "Passenger and Allied Service Revenue.'' 
Between 1950 and 1965 P.& A.S. revenue of both the 
Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific declined (the decrease was 
greater for the Southern Pacific than for the Santa Fe). 
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This revenue as a percent of total operating revenue (freight 
and paesenger) also decreased for both carriers. Since 1954, 
however, Santa Fe P.& A.S. revenue has leveled off, whereas 
the Southern Pacific posts a decline for all years between 
1950 and 1965. 
The Santa Fe grossed less per passenger train mile and 
per gross ton mile than the Southern Pacific between 1950 and 
1965. However, the Santa Fe gross revenues per car trip, per 
train trip, and per passenger were all higher than the South-
ern Pacific results. 
Santa Fe freight service tends to be more profitable 
than Southern Pacific's for most years studied. This profit-
ability is in spite of the fact that Southern Pacific total 
gross revenue is larger for all years studied. Perhaps the 
Santa Fe considers itself fortunate to have a passenger ser-
vice able to bear a portion of common costs that would other-
wise be assigned to freight service. 
In general, the Santa Fe has tended to maintain its 
P.& A.S. total gross while increasing its per-unit gross 
revenue between 1954 and 1965 by improved operation and 
agressive salesmanship. The Southern Pacific has tended 
in the opposite direction. Also, the Santa Fe's passenger 
service was supplied in conjunction with a freight service 
that was generally more profitable than that of the rival 
Southern Pacific. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NATURE OF RAILROAD PRODUCTION COSTS 
AND COST MEASURES 
It is helpful, prior to the discussion of the actual 
expense data, to fix in the reader's mind both the nature of 
railroad production costs and the nature of the available 
data categories used to account for these costs. This chap-
ter describes the nature of railroad costs, explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of the available cost data, and 
finally, outlines those particular cost categories generally 
used by railroad management as the basis for output decisions. 
THE NATURE OF RAILROAD COSTS 
The dominant characteristic of the railroad's cost struc-
ture is its multiproduct operation. The Santa Fe and South-
ern Pacific each produce, at the very least, two products--
passenger and freight service. Within either of these two 
outputs, various other component outputs are definable. For 
example, within passenger service mail, express and baggage, 
coach and Pullman service could each be identified as an out-
put separate from the others. 
Possible cost groupings. Railroad production costs can 
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be grouped in two ways. First, either a cost can vary with 
output (variable cost), or its total can be independent of 
the output level (fixed cost). Second, a cost may be traced 
to a particular output (directly related cost), or to several 
different outputs necessarily produced together (joint cost), 
or to the total output of the firm in general (common cost). 
Multlproduct output by railroads results in common costs 
and poses the problem of how costs shall be arbitrarily allo-
cated among the various different outputs of the firm. 
These two general cost groupings are not mutually ex-
elusive categories. For a given output such as passenger and 
allied services the following possible cost groupings can 
exist: 
a) fixed directly related costs 
b) fixed joint costs 
c) fixed common costs 
d) variable directly related coats 
e) variable joint costs 
f) variable common costs. 
These possible cost groupings can be reduced by two when one 
realizes that joint costs are really a special type of common 
cost. Expenses that would be avoided if a given output were 
not produced can be called directly related costs and all 
other expenses would be, by definition, common costs. 
Short!:.!:!!! definition of costs. The possible cost group-
ings mentioned above assume a time period conventionally iden-
tified as the short run. The firm operating in the short 
run can vary output only by the use of more, or less, variable 
inputs in combination with a fixed plant, the capacity of 
which is set. 1 
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The long run period is defined as 11 ••• time long 
enough for the firm to be able to vary the quantities per 
unit of time of all resources used. 112 As here defined, the 
long run period is not very useful when one examines an 
established firm. Joel Dean states that 
in the real world, adjustments to higher output, 
new materials or a new product design typically 
take a variety of forms that fall short of the 
perfect adaptation of the long run cost curves. 
They progress gradually by widening a succession 
of bottlenecks~ rather than by adding an entire 
balanced unit.::> 
Problems of~ identification. A railroad has cer-
tain physical characteristics that are unique to its pro-
duction process and that tend to make accurate cost iden-
tification difficult. The railroad production process is a 
continuous one within a physical plant that may be thousands 
of miles long. Inputs are consumed in a variety of ways at 
a variety of locations, each with differing physical and 
cost characteristics. The weather introduces a variation of 
more importance to railroads than to most productive enter-
prises. For the most part, each production run is a unique 
operation. 
Maintenance of equipment and the physical plant may be 
difficult to relate to production levels because such main-
1Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource 
Allocation (New York, 1960)-;---revised ed. p. T2i-O'. 
2 rbld., p. 141. 
3Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, 
1951), p. 280. 
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tenance may be postponed until either a period of slack 
business when the plant is idle or until sufficient funds are 
available. In other words, cost of production and expense 
outlay resulting from this cost are not linked tightly to-
gether. 
Another impediment to cost determination is the simul-
taneous nature of production and consumption: there are no 
"inventories" of finished goods maintained on hand. Ladd 
states that 
••• this absence of inventories has meant that 
one of the mainsprings of manufacturing cost 
accounting--the valuation of inventories--is not 
a part of the ~verall accounting mechanisms of 
the railroads •. 
In addition, railroad costs include not only the costs of 
running trains but also a variety of construction, retail, 
and manufacturing operations.5 
The organization of railroads as a process or production 
will influence the methods of cost data collection, processing, 
and interpretation. The management organization will also 
exact an influence on these methods as well as on the way in 
which cost data are used to control and direct the production 
process. 
Most railroads are organized into departments such as 
transportation, marketing, maintenance, and so forth along 
4nwight R. Ladd, Cost Data for the Management of Rail-
~ Passenger Service--nrciston, 1957'f:-p. 31. ~ ~ 
5John R. Meyer et al., Avoidable Costs of Passenger 
Train Service ( Cambridge, 1957), P• 34. -
the lines of physical characteristics. Each department tends 
to be an enclave that develops, in considerable isolation, 
its own data and management responsibilities. Ladd states 
that there seems to be little lateral movement among the 
various departments of most railroads. 6 For example, the 
records kept in the maintenance department are usually suited 
only for use in solving problems of maintenance. 
Furthermore, to the extent that overall data and records 
are kept by railroads, their purpose tends toward satis-
fying the requirements of regulatory bodies and the dictates 
of fiduciary accounting.7 
Within this physical and organizational framework, the 
generation of useful cost data is exceedingly difficult and 
requires, usually, a specially organized study. For this 
reason, records of individual passenger train schedules are 
usually accumulated only to substantiate a train-off peti-
tion rather than to guide management policy direction of this 
schedule on a profit-oriented basis. In other words, before 
cost data are collected for a specific train, management has 
already decided that the train is a hopeless loser. 8 
Other than the specific train-off cost data mentioned 
above, the only expense data the railroads have (at least for 
publication) is a collection of aggregate expenses either 
6 Ladd, P• 34. 
7 Ibid., p. 35. 
8 Ibid., p. 39. 
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directly related to or apportioned to passenger service. 
These data collection processes are unwieldy due to the rail-
roads' organization and the regulatory demands on the accounting 
system. In addition, the generation of useful cost data from 
this collection process is impaired by the multi-product nat-
ure of the firm and its unique physical characteristics. 
AVAILABLE COST DATA 
Internal cost records of the Santa Fe and Southern Paci-
fie railroads were not available for the purposes of this 
study. 9 Therefore, the data for both carrier's cost have 
been drawn from the reports made annually by each to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. These data are available 
only in aggregate form; that is, there is no cost data avail-
able that is defined in terms of individual train schedules. 
The only source of individual data has been the piecemeal 
collection of rather incomplete cost figures collected from 
the records of train-off hearings before various state com-
missions. When one recalls the purpose for which these indi-
vidual cost figures were compiled, as well as the general 
lack of precise definition of the various cost categories, 
such isolated data seem of scant utility. 
Interstate Commerce Commission data format. The aggre-
9Both the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroads refused 
to supply useful expense data. While they expressed sympathy 
with the goals of this project, such data were considered 
confidential by both carriers. 
gate cost data reported by each carrier to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission are divided into the following categories: 
a) Maintenance of Way and Structures 
b) Maintenance of Equipment 
c) Traffic 
d) Transportation--Rall Line 
e) Miscellaneous Operations 
f) General. 
The first two categories above are self-explanatory. 
Traffic expense is that expense connected with promoting 
and advertising the railraod's services, as well as com-
missions to travel agents. Transportation--Rail Line groups 
the expenses incurred in actually moving the trains over the 
road: wages of crews, fuel and supplies and so forth. Mis-
cellaneous Operations groups activities not assignable to 
the other categories. The only expense of importance to 
passenger service in this category is the coats of dining 
service. Finally, General expenses account for the costs of 
central offices and office help, as well as the salaries of 
the general officers of the railroad. 
Each of the six categories mentioned above is further 
subdivided into numerous sub-accounts. Depending on the 
category, the number of sub-accounts varies from eleven to 
nearly fifty. There ls also some year to year variation in 
the number of various sub-accounts, although the six major 
cost categories are maintained intact. 
Within each of the six major cost groups just discussed 
expenses are separated along the following lines: 
a) Total operating expenses for the year 
b) 
~~ 
e) 
f) 
g) 
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Expenses related solely to freight service 
Common expenses apportioned to freight service 
Total freight expense 
Expenses related solely to passenger and 
allied services 
Common expenses apportioned to passenger 
and allied services 
Total passenger expense. 
Limitations of Interstate Commerce Commission format. 
The emphasis of the above format is to first separate expen-
ses on the basis of their place in the production process 
(for example, way and structures, equipment repair, crew 
expense, and so forth). Second, these expenses are divided, 
for accounting purposes, between freight and passenger ser-
vice. This division involves an arbitrary allocation of 
common expenses between freight and passenger operatlons. 10 
The third, and most limiting feature of this data for-
mat, is the failure to attempt a separation of these expenses 
between variable and fixed. For example, expenses related 
solely to passenger and allied services (usually called 
"directly related expenses") conta.in some variable and some 
fixed expenses. This category does not accurately reflect 
the expenses that could be eliminated by the discontinuance 
of passenger service. Expenses that could be avoided by 
leaving the passenger business are partly in the "solely 
related" and partly in the "apportioned common" expenses. 
10see statement no. 577, A Brief History .2.f the Separation 
of Railroad Operating Expenses Between Freight a.ndPassenger 
Services, (Washington, 1957); also, Rules Goverii!ng the Separ-
ation of o,erating Expenses, Railway Taxes, Equipment'"""Rents, 
and Joliit ac1lity Rents Between Frei~t a.nd Passenger Service 
.!:?!! Class l Railroads, (Washington, 19 ).---
Major~ source f.2!:. ~ study. Assuming that the 
profitability of passenger service is best measured by the 
extent to which revenues exceed the avoidable costs, the 
category "Expenses related solely to passenger service" 
provides the best available measure of avoidable costs. 
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For the most part, use of the data in this measure will be 
restricted to use of the totals of each of the six expense 
classifications mentioned previously (maintenance of way and 
structures, equipment, traffic, transportation, miscellaneous, 
and general). Detailed comparison of the Santa Fe and Southern 
Pacific sub-accounts within each of these classifications 
would be of little use because these sub-accounts represent 
little more than pigeonholes into which operating expenses 
are stuffed. Ladd states that although" ••• the pigeonhol-
ing is done with care and in detail ••• the logic behind the 
divisions between the pigeonholes is rather obscure at times. 1111 
For example, the I.C.C. recognizes twenty-seven different 
types of passenger train cars, yet the cost of repairs to all 
these cars is placed in one sub-account ("Passenger train 
oars") in the Maintenance of Equipment category. At the same 
time, however, there are five different sub-accounts for the 
cost of paper clips used and eight different places to show 
the cost of brooms. 12 
"Expense related solely to passenger service" is used 
1 1 Ladd, p. 56 • 
12ibid. 
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as the major cost category in this study despite its limita-
tions. In the first place, it is available. In the second, 
it is generally used by rail management to gauge passenger 
service profitability. l3 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Railroads are characterized by multiproduct output. 
For this reason, some costs of production are common to the 
production of many different outputs and the decision to 
allocate these common costs among the various outputs is 
made arbitrarily. 
Railroad expenses can be viewed as either variable with 
output or independent of output levels (variable costs or 
fixed costs). Expenses can also be either directly related 
to the production of a given output type or canmon to the 
production of all outputs. Therefore, directly-related 
costs can contain both fixed and variable elements. The 
same is true with common costs. 
The generation of useful coat data for railroad output 
is difficult. This difficulty is caused in part by railroads' 
enclave-like organizational characteristics as well as the 
almost unique physical dimensions of the plant. The standard-
ized accounting procedure used by railroads to report to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission likewise results in data group-
ings and collection processes that are not very useful. 
13 ibid., p. 259. 
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Cost data was not available directly from the railroads 
studied. Consequently, recourse was made to published and 
unpublished (but public) expense data reported by these rail-
roads to the Interstate Commerce Commission. These data are 
divided among six major expense categories: maintenance of 
way and structures, maintenance of equipment, traffic, trans-
portation--rail line, miscellaneous operations and general 
expense. 
Within each of these six categories, the total expense 
for each was first divided between freight service and pass-
enger service. Then within each of these two output types, 
the relevant expense was further divided between directly-
related expenses and apportioned common expense. 
The major data category used in this study is "Expenses 
related solely to passenger and allied service." The limita-
tion of this category is that it contains some fixed costs 
a.nd probably excludes some directly related variable costs 
for want of a better accounting system. 
Other than the fact that it is available, the justifica-
tion for using this single category as the relevant passenger 
service expense category rests with the fact that it ls com-
monly used by rail management to gauge passenger service 
profitability. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE EVOLUTION OF EXPENSES DIRECTLY RELATED TO 
PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE OPERATIONS: 
A COMPARISON OF THE SANTA FE RAILWAY 
AND THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY 
FROM 1950 THROUGH 1965 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the passenger 
service expenses of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific oper-
ations between 1950 and 1965. The Santa Fe and the Southern 
Pacific data will be compared over this time span, and ex-
planations of the observed trends will be offered. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, and on the basis 
of available cost data, 11 expenses directly related to pass-
enger and allied service'' is the category of costs deemed 
most useful for the purposes of this study. Because the 
Interstate Commerce Commission specifies an accounting system 
that focuses on direct versus common costs, rather than upon 
fixed versus variable costs, this category will contain some 
fixed costs. Some costs that do vary with passenger service 
output will be excluded from this category for the same rea-
son. The category "expenses directly related to passenger 
and allied services 11 will only approximate the amounts that 
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could be saved if the passenger operation were eliminated. 
ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO THE DATA 
An inspection of the data indicated that some statistical 
adjustments might be in order. The basic problem areas are 
discussed below. 
Consistent allocation of common expenses. Inspection of 
the data showed that the Southern Pacific was not consistent 
in the assignment of certain major operating expenses from 
year to year. "Repairs of Passenger Locomotives", a sub-
category in the Maintenance of Equipment expense category, 
was considered by the Southern Pacific to be a common expense 
through 1954. There was no directly related expense assigned 
to passenger service in this sub-category. After 1954, 
the Southern Pacific treated this expense wholly as a direct 
expense--there was no common expense assigned. As the amount 
involved each year was in the vicinity of eight million 
dollars, the effect of one allocation method, or the other, 
upon Southern Pacific's direct passenger expense was signif-
icant. 
Santa Fe treated "Repairs of Passenger Locomotives" as 
a directly related expense in total for all years, 1950 
through 1965. This road allocated no common expense to this 
category. 
In this study, to achieve a higher degree of compar-
ability than would otherwise have been possible, Southern 
Pacific "Repairs of Passenger Locomotives" expense was treated 
for all years as a direct expense in conformity with Santa 
Fe allocation procedures. 
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The lag between production and expenses. A time lag 
exists between the firm's use of a resource in the production 
process and the appearance of the associated expense on the 
company records. There is a loose link between production 
and its related expenses. Thia lag is especially important 
when studying firms like railroads that use large amounts of 
capital goods. The repair of railroad equipment and other 
fixed facilities may bear little close relation to railroad 
output. Especially if traffic is heavy, the repair of a 
railroad's capital goods may be delayed into the next account-
ing period. 
In addition, if a railroad has decided to eliminate 
passenger service, the capital goods used in the production 
of this product line will not be repaired and maintained, 
much less replaced. For a time, at least until the capital 
stock wears out, accounting expenses for this reason will 
decline. The firm is "living off its capital." Observation 
of the Southern Pacific trains from California to New Orleans 
provide good examples of this method of cost reduction. 
Because of these limitations, it might seem advisable to 
adjust the expense data by some method of moving averages to 
smooth the rough ties between production and expenses. A 
statistical cost analysis of each carrier would probably 
require such an adjustment; this historical-descriptive 
study, focused upon management's interpretation of unadjusted 
93 
expenses, does not. 
Dollar inflation. Because this study uses time series 
data, the various expense trends (in dollar terms) reflect 
both the changes in costs and the variability in the dollar's 
purchasing power. The question arises as to whether this 
inflation effect should be removed from the data. For this 
study conversion of the expense data was deemed unnecessary. 
First, as these data are to be compared with revenue data, 
there would be some question about what deflators to use 
that would operate similarily upon both revenue and expense 
data. Second, for any given year, management is interested 
in whether this year's revenues cover this year's costs by 
the yardstick of current prices. 
Although the data will not be deflated, an awareness 
of railroads' cost inflation between 1950 and 1965 makes the 
non-deflated expense data more meaningful. 
Figure 13, using 1950 as the base year, is an index of 
American railroads' materials and wage costs. This price 
index increased to 176.1 in 1965 after pausing slightly in 
its rise during 1954-1955. 
DIRECT EXPENSE TOTALS 
Santa Fe's total P.& A.S. direct expense increased 
from $73.6 million in 1950 to a high of $96 million in 1956 
and declined thereafter to $87 million in 1965 (Table 16). 
Southern Pacific's total direct P.& A.S. expense was smaller 
for all these years; $61.7 million in 1950, $82.6 million in 
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FIGURE 13. 
COMPOSITE INDEX OF MATERIAL PRICES AND WAGE RATES 
PAID BY RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES* 
1950 - 1965 
( 1950 = 100) 
*Does not include overtime and other supplemen-
tary pay. 
Source: Yearbook of Railroad Facts 1967 Edition, 
Bureau of°"Railway Economics7°Association 
of American Railroads, (Washington, 1967), 
p. 79. 
TABLE HS 
TOTAL DIRECTLY RELATED PASSENGER AND ALLIED 
SERVICE EXPENSE: SANTA FE AND 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
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Santa Fe Southern Pacific 
Year {x 1000) t ~ 1000) 
1950 $ 73,650 $ 61, 70 3 
1951 87,324 71, 8 34 
1952 90,470 721,- ,470 
1953 78,849 76,572 
1954 88 ,834 78 ,031 
1955 85, 369 81, 867 
1956 96,002 82,579 
1957 93,312 77,046 
1958 83, 750 69,670 
1959 84,781 67,781 
1960 85, 1 37 64,224 
1961 80, 170 62,575 
1962 83, 664 52,664 
1963 85, 197 51,142 
1964 87,851 45,397 
1965 87, 192 40,762 
Source: Annual Report of The Atchison, Topeka, and 
Santa Fe Railway co":" to The Interstate 
Commerce Commissiori";° Twashington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid.,~ Southern Pacific Company. 
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1956, and $40.7 million in 1965 (Table 16). Direct P.& A.S. 
expense was at its high point for both carriers in 1956 and 
though both roads were able to decrease their expense trends 
after 1956, the Santa Fe's decline was neither steady, nor 
particularly large. In contrast, the Southern Pacific was 
able to decrease its direct P.& A.S. expense significantly 
and steadily between 1956 and 1965. Santa Fe's direct 
expense was larger in 1965 than in 1950. The reverse was 
true for the Southern Pacific •. 
COMPOSITION OF DIRECT EXPENSES 
Tables 17 and 18 break down each carrier's direct 
P.& A.S. expense total into its component categories. These 
components are each expressed as a percent of total direct 
P.& A.S. expense. 
Transportation--E!.!l ~· This category represents 
approximately 50 percent of each road's direct P.& A.S. 
expense and is the most important of all expense categories. 
It is the sum for forty eight sub-accounts, those most 
significant being the wages of station employees, train and 
yard crews, train fuel, train supplies, signal operation, 
crossing protection and employees' health and welfare 
benefits. 
Maintenance£! Equipment. For most years studied 
approximately 30 percent of total P.& A.S. direct expense 
is traced to this second largest expense category. This 
account groups twenty five sub-accounts, the. more important 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 17 
COMPOSITION OF EXPENSE DIRECTLY RELATED TO PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE 
OPERATIONS BY CATEGORY, AB PERCENT OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSE 
SANTA FE RAILROAD, 1950 - 1965* 
Maintenance -of way~ Maintenance of 
and structures eguipment Traffic Transportation Miscellanepus 
0.89 29.20 7.19 48.35 13.49 
1. 56 29.73 7.37 46.95 13. 59 
1.49 30.15 7. 21 46.29 14.04 
1. 81 21.00 7.15 53.98 15.14 
1. 58 30. 26 7.34 47.06 12. 97 . 
1. 56 31.76 1.00 46.40 12.44 
1. 41 30.87 6.62 48.45 11.83 
1. 51 31. 21 6.55 48.09 11. 81 
1. 38 31.58 6.71 47.47 11. 91 
1.47 31.66 1.01 47.28 11. 60 
1. 52 32.28 6.86 47.66 10.73 
1.46 32.87 7 .17 47.00 10.57 
1 .67 32.03 8.05 47.06 10.17 
1.63 33.59 7.98 45.93 9.89 
1. 56 32.38 8.09 46.89 10.08 
1. 54 30.77 7.59 48.89 10. 20 
*Percentages may not total to 100 each year due to rounding. 
Source: Annual Report of The Atchison, Topeka, .and Santa Fe Railway Co. to The 
Inters.t.ate CommerceCommlsslon, (Washington, 1950-1965). - - -
GeneI"al 
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o.84 
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TABLE 18 
COMPOSITION OF EXPENSE DIRECTLY RELATED TO PASSENGER AND ALLIED SERVICE 
OPERATIONS BY CATEGORY, AS PERCENT OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSE 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD, 1950 - 1965 
Maintenance of way Maintenance of 
and structures eguipment Traffic Transportation Miscellanequs 
0.78 21.96 1.19 53.45 14.49 
0.81 25.03 7.18 52.48 13.04 
1.09 24.92 7. 37 52.74 12.40 
o.84 28.20 7.20 50. 71 11.69 
o.84 32.38 6.87 47.67 11.09 
1.06 31. 17 7.33 48.71 10. 39 
0.98 32.54 6.48 48.40 10.12 
o.84 34. 38 6.06 47.46 9.59 
0.85 35.77 5.34 46.65 9.69 
1 .oo 36.65 4.87 46.77 9. 21 
o.87 35.88 4.19 48.49 9.19 
1.41 32.90 3.84 50.06 9.12 
0.95 34.42 4.54 49.46 10.48 
1.00 36. 31 3.92 50.44 8.22 
o.89 36. 28 3.95 50.63 8.15 
0.78 36. 39 3.27 50.62 8.89 
*Percentages~may~not total to fOO each year due to rounding. 
Source: Annual Report of The Southern Pacific Company to The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, (Washington, 1950-1965). ~ ~ 
General 
1.52 
1.46 
1.49 
1.35 
1.15 
1.34 
1.48 
1.66 
1.68 
1. 39 
1. 38 
2.66 
0.15 
0.11 
0.10 
0.01 
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being locomotive and passenger car repairs, equipment depre-
ciation, and maintenance of miscellaneous equipment. 
Miscellaneous Operations. This category is third 
largest, at approximately ten percent of the total direct 
expense over most years,studied. Dining and buffet services 
expense is the only significant sub-account in this category. 
Traffic. The total P.& A.S. direct expense in this 
fourth largest account remained at about seven percent over 
all years studied for the Santa Fe, but declined rapidly 
between 1950 and 1965 in Southern Pacific's accounts. The 
two major passenger service sub-accounts in this category 
are the expense of outside traffic agencies and advertising. 1 
Maintenance .Qf. Way~ Structures. This expense cate-
gory is the sum of forty sub-accounts. It is fifth largest 
of the direct expense categories for both carriers for each 
year of the 1950-1965 period and amounts to about one per-
cent of total P.& A.S. direct expense. 
General expense. This is consistently the least signif-
icant category of total P.& A.S. total direct expense for 
both railroads. It is the sum of eleven sub-accounts and is 
typically one percent, or le~s, of total direct expense. 
DIRECT EXPENSE TRENDS 
Santa Fe. Between 1950 and 1965 the percent division of 
Santa Fe P.& A.S. total direct expense among the six expense 
1see page 60 and Table 12 for discussion and data relative 
to each carrier's advertising efforts and expenses. 
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categories did not fluctuate very much from year to year. 
The relative change in this composition that did occur was 
primarily due to cutbacks in buffet and dining service. 
One would expect both the Maintenance of Way and the 
General expense categories to respond in a rather sticky 
fashion to changes in output. The Santa Fe data seem to sup-
port this statement since, as gross ton miles declined, Main-
tenance of Way and General direct expense assumed slightly 
greater importance as a percent of total direct expense. In 
other words, the number of stations and the number of gen-
eral clerks were more fixed than variable as passenger ser-
vice output decreased. 
Santa Fe Traffic expense increased slightly in a relative 
sense between 1950 and 1965, but only partly for the reasons 
of "fixity" suggested in the previous paragraph. The dollar 
expense of advertising remained nearly constant during this 
time period while efforts to sell passenger service through 
2 
non-railroad travel agencies increased. 
Transportation--Rail Line expense, as a percent of total 
direct expense, remained stable over the 1950-1965 span 
(Table 17). This stability is no surprise because the dollar 
amount of this expense category should respond more readily 
to changes in output than should expenses of other types. 
2outside agency expense increased from $2.6 million in 
1950 to $3.7 million in 1965. Annual Report of 1h!! Atchison, 
Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co. to the Interstate Commerce 
Commissioii';' (Washington, 1950~nd"'t"905T. 
101 
Maintenance of equipment expense fluctuated between 
21 and nearly' 34 percent of total P.& A.S. direct expense 
during the 1950-1965 period (Table 17). A variation of this 
magnitude must be explained. Maintenance of Equipment ex-, 
pense was 21 percent of total direct expense--the smallest 
value of all years atudled--in 1953, a year of heavy pas-
senger travel. During such times of heavy demand every piece 
of equipment that can turn a wheel la kept in service and out 
of the shop. For the most part, equipment repairs during 
such times of high output are confined to only those deemed 
absolutely necessary.3 For this reason, such expenses may 
be at a minimum when output is at a high level. 
During more "normal" levels of output, Maintenance of 
Equipment expense should tend to be only slightly variable 
with output, as equipment is "shopped" when it can be spared 
from service, when there is shop space available to make the 
repairs and (in some cases) when the periodic repair 
"ritual" falls due. For example, it has been the practice 
to shop each locomotive on an annual basis--to tear it down 
and inspect its components for wear and damage. This prac-
tice is gradually giving way to more scientific methods of 
discovering the need for repairs. 4 
Finally, Maintenance of Equipment expense will be biased 
3tetter to the author from J. T. Smith, Santa Fe Super-
intendent of Shops at Los Angeles, California, M~y 21, 1966. 
4 Interview with L. o. Townley, Santa Fe Chief Mechanical 
Engineer at Topeka, Kansas, April 19, 1967. 
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upward during those years when equipment is replaced. The 
Santa Fe equipped its major trains with a combination of new 
equipment and heavily rebuilt older equipment in 1950, 1953, 
1956, and 1964. Not all of the resulting expense is capit-
alized on the books; some is treated as direct operating 
expense of the year involved.5 
Southern Pacific. Except for Maintenance of Way and 
Structures and Transportation--Rail Line categories, which 
remained a stable percent between 1950 and 1965, the com-
position of Southern Pacific total direct expense changed 
considerably over time. In 1965, the Southern Pacific direct 
expense categories fell in the same order of importance as 
that listed previously for the Santa Fe (Table 18). 
Maintenance of Equipment direct P.& A.S. expense varied 
from 21.96 percent in 1950 to 36.39 percent in 1965 (Table 
18). Because the Southern Pacific purchased little new 
passenger equipment in the last decade, this increase can-
not be attributed to assignment of purchase expenses to 
this account as was true of the Santa Fe. It would. seem that 
this expense category cannot be decreased in line with cuts 
in output. As output declined rapidly on the Southern Pac-
ific and some expenses were eliminated, this "semi-variable" 
expense assumed increased relative importance as a component 
of P.& A.S. total direct expense. 
511ATSF's March: Making a Great Railroad Greater," E!.ll-
way Age, 150, No. 26,·(Deoember 21, 1964), p. 25. 
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The three Southern Pacific categories that decreased in 
relative importance between 1950 and 1965 were Miscellaneous, 
Traffic and General expenses. The decline in Miscellaneous 
expense was due to the wholesale elimination of dining ser-
vice; the decline in Traffic expense could be traced to a 
cut in advertising expenses. General expenses decreased 
significantly only since 1962. The rapid decline from 2.66 
percent of total direct expense in 1961 to 0.15 percent in 
1962 suggests that the Southern Pacific passenger service 
was. subsequent to that date, "orphaned" from any significant 
management effort at the top level (Table 18). 6 
Summary of total direct expense trends. Comparison of 
the two carrier's direct expense composition over a period 
when Santa Fe maintained output and Southern Pacific cut 
output rapidly makes clear that the most significant direct 
expense categories of P.& A.S. operations did not vary smoothly 
with output changes. Some expenses could be eliminated easily 
(such as advertising). Some expenses varied only slightly 
with output. Those expenses that were easily reduced tended 
to become a decreasing percent of total direct expense, while 
the less variable expenses became a larger percent of this 
expense total. 
Significantly, the two largest expense categories--
Transportation--Rail Line and Maintenance of Equipment--
6Letter to the author from Southern Pacific historian 
G.L. Dunscomb, September 4, 1966. 
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appear to vary either roughly in proportion to output changes 
and remain a rather constant percent of the total as has Trans-
portation, or like Maintenance of Equipment, vary only slightly 
in response to output changes and become an increas1ngly im-
portant component of total direct expense. 
· Perhaps the only way to control "semi-variable" expenses 
ls to get out of the passenger business entirely. 
DIRECT EXPENSE PER UNIT OUTPUT 
When one compares Santa Fe and Southern Pacific total 
direct costs on the basis of either passenger train miles or 
gross ton miles between 1950 and 1965 four things are evident: 
(1) both railroads' unit dollar expense increased over time 
in a continual fashion; (2) the Southern Pacific unit expenses 
were usually greater than comparable Santa Fe figures; (3) the 
Southern Pacific had rapid increases in unit expenses between 
1954-55 and 1960-61 that did not occur within the Santa Fe 
operation; and (4) since 1961, the Southern Pacific trimmed 
its unit expenses rather sharply (Figures 14 and 15). 
It should be noted that the Southern Pacific compared 
least favorably with the Santa Fe during a period that coin-
cided almost exactly with a rapid increase in the railroads' 
price index (Figure 13). Perhaps the Santa Fe was able to 
better offset the effects of inflation via greater efficiency 
than the Southern Pacific was able to muster. An equally 
plausable explanation can be traced to the diverging output 
levels. The Santa Fe (especially between 1955 and 1961) 
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Source: Annual Report£!~ Atchison, Topeka,~ 
Santa Fe Railway Co. to The Interstate 
Commerce Commiesioil, "{washington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid., lh.2 §.2..!:!thern Pacific Company. 
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decreased passenger train gross ton miles sharply (Figure 4}. 
This was largely due to the elimination of most branch-line 
runs--small scale operations with old equipment having total 
direct expenses that were probably wholly ''avoidable" in a 
fashion linked tightly to this output change. The low 
capacity, high unit expense runs were eliminated. 
The Southern Pacific decreased output during this time 
with the elimination of some local runs, but primarily with 
the cutback of service on long-haul routes. The long-haul 
operation entails expenses that do not vary quickly with 
changes in output--unless the long-haul service ls totally 
eliminated. 
While Santa Fe's total direct expense decreased as 
output decreased, hence holding the line on unit expenses, 
Southern Pacific's total direct expense declined at a pace 
much slower than passenger train output in gross ton miles 
and resulted in unit expenses that rose rapidly. 
DIRECT EXPENSE PER TRAIN TRIP 
Figure 17 pictures the trends of Santa Fe and Southern 
Pacific direct expense per passenger train trip between 1950 
and 1965. Between 1950 and 1965 Santa Fe expense per average 
train trip increased from around $1,600 to nearly $4,400. 
This increase is striking in comparison to the Southern 
Pacific's rather modest increase from nearly $800 in 1950 
to $1,100 in 1965. 
The explanations offered previously to explain compar-
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ative differences in total direct expense apply also 1n this 
case. Attention must be focused, however, upon the evolving 
composition of each carrier's "average" passenger train. 
The Santa Fe's average train between 1950 and 1965 traveled 
farther and faster than its Southern Pacific counterpart. 
The length of Santa Fe's average train increased, while the 
Southern Pacific decreased its train length somewhat. The 
average Santa Fe train was increased 1n length by adding 
head-end oars while maintaining the number of more costly 
passenger-carrying cars. The Southern Pacific sharply 
decreased the number of passenger-carrying oars per average 
train. maintaining train length (to the extent it was main-
tained) by using more head-end cars. 
Whereas the Santa Fe moved more strongly into the long-
haul passenger train business between 1950 and 1965, the 
Southern Pacific took the opposite tack, apparently with 
plans for eventual elimination of all long-haul service. 
Table 19 further breaks down the direct expense data on 
a per-car-trip basis. The wide divergence between Santa Fe 
and Southern Pacific direct expense per passenger oar trip 
can be traced to the same reasons that explain differences 
in expense per train trip. 
FREIGHT SERVICE OPERATING EXPENSES 
Total operatin5 eX,Eense. Table 20 traces each railroad's 
total freight operating expense from 1950 to 1965. These 
expenses include apportioned common costs under the rationale 
TABLE 19 
ESTIMATE* OF DIRECTLY RELATED PASSENGER AND ALLIED 
SERVICE EXPENSE PER PASSENGER CAR TRIP 
SANTA FE AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965 
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Santa Fe Southern Pacific 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
$147.95 
185.82 
187.64 
166. 58 
203. 29 
195.80 
239.41 
250.13 
253.52 
265.04 
279.85 
282.28 
294.97 
292.89 
301. 58 
326.62 
$57.99 
10.82 
10.00 
65.22 
63. 11 
62.29 
72.32 
75.11 
75.58 
77.54 
72.48 
69.00 
66.67 
66.06 
58.87 
84.35 
*Estimates calculated by method described in footnote 10, 
page 67. 
Source: Annual Report of ,!h! Atchison, Topeka, ~ 
Santa Fe Railway Co. to The Interstate 
Commerce Comm1ss1oii;" Twashington, 1950-1965). 
Ibid., The Southern Pacific Company. 
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TABLE 20 
FREIGHT SERVICE OPERATING EXPENSES* SANTA FE 
AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
Freight service operating Percent of total 
ex::eense !x 1000 l operatins expense 
Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
1950 $249, 158 $251,918 69.6 73.3 
1 951 305, 206 290,986 71.6 73.7 
1952 299,371 306,817 70. 7 74.o 
1953 317,035 314, 197 71.8 74.5 
1954 278,693 296,712 69.8 73.9 
1955 300, 412 419,334 72.3 79.3 
1956 319,640 437, 187 71. 3 79.7 
1957 348, 763 429,019 73.6 80.6 
1958 332,829 426,842 75.0 82.2 
1959 366, 620 431 ,006 76.8 79.8 
1960 370, 661 442,868 76.g 84.o 
1961 360, 31~7 447 ,832 77.2 85.8 
1962 377, 860 478,992 77.9 87.2 
1963 385,972 487, 181 77.8 88. 1 
1964 · 400,620 520,926 78. 2 89.5 
1965 403, 206 ·555,922 78. 5 90.0 
1950-1965 
change +61.82% +120.92% 
*Includes apportioned common expense. 
Source: Annual Report of .!h!! Atchison, Topeka,~ Santa Fe 
Railway Co. to The Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington,--'f950-1965). 
Ibid., Ih.! Southern Pacific Company. 
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that :freight service is the major output of both the Santa Fe 
and Southern Pao1:fio and hence will ultimately have to bear 
at least a share of the common expenses. 
Santa Fe freight expense has increased nearly 62 percent 
between 1950 and 1965, :from $249 million to $403 million. 
Southern Pacific's freight expense. however, increased much 
more rapidly, 121 percent over the same period, from $252 
million to $556 million (Table 20). Over this time, while 
Santa Fe freight expense increased from 70 percent to nearly 
79 percent of total operating expenses, Southern Pacific 
:freight expense increased from 73 percent to 91 percent of 
that road's total operating expenses. 
~~output freight expense. Santa Fe expense per 
freight train mile and per gross ton mile have tended to be 
larger than similar Southern Pacific measures for all years 
studied (Table 21). Southern Pacific unit expense measures 
have increased at a more rapid rate, however, than the Santa 
Fe expenses. 
Summar! of freight expense. Santa Fe's total freight 
expenses were less than those of the Southern Pacific and 
did not increase as rapidly as the latter road's expenses 
between 1950 and 1965. Although Santa Fe had the greater 
unit expense per freight train mile and per gross ton mile 
for each year, the Southern Pacific's unit costs increased 
at a more rapid rate. The greater Santa Fe unit expense is 
probably traoed to that road's operation of comparatively 
shorter and faster trains, requiring more engine crews and 
TABLE 21 
SELECTED FREIGHT SERVICE EXPENSE DATA* SANTA FE 
AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 1950 - 1965 
11 3 
Per freight train mile 
Santa Southern 
Per gross ton mile 
Santa Southern 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1950-1965 
change 
Fe Pacific 
$ 8.45 
9.64 
9.12 
. 10. 27 
1 O. 35 · 
10.06 
· 10. 82 
12.05 
12.52 
11. 63 
12.01 
12. 70 
13.27 
13. 51 
13. 36 
13.00 
+53.85% 
$ 5.52 
6.44 
6.81 
1.08 
7.10 
9.42 
10. 18 
10.89 
11. 26 
10.55 
11. 4o 
12.01 
12. 28 
12.25 
12. 70 
12. 96 
+134.78% 
*Includes apportioned common expense. 
Fe Pacific 
.84¢ 
.93 
.92 
.98 
• 96 
.90 
• 94 
1.03 
1.00 
1.02 
1 .o 1 
1.00 
1.05 
1.04 
1 .o 1 
• 97 
+15.48% 
.54¢ 
• 59 
• 60 
.63 
.61 
.80 
.82 
.85 
.86 
.79 
.83 
.88 
.88 
.86 
.86 
.86 
+59. 26% 
Source: Annual Report .2! Ih2. Atchison, Topeka, .!lli! Santa Fe 
Railway Co. to The Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washingt'on,-r950-1965}. 
Ibid., ll:llt southern Fao1t1o company. 
imposing more speed-oriented wear on the physical plant than 
takes place on the Southern Pacific. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Between 1950 and 1965 Santa Fe's direct P.& A.S. expense 
increased while the Southern Pacific's declined. In addition, 
while the composition of Santa Fe's total direct expense (as 
divided among the six expense categories) remained fairly 
stable, the composition of Southern Pacific's total direct 
expense shifted, with the more "fixed" expense items assuming 
increased importance relative to the total. 
Direct expense per passenger train mile and per.gross 
ton mile trended upward for both carriers between 1950 and 
1965. On a per-trip basis the Santa Fe direct expense was 
greater than that of the Southern Pacific. 
The reasons for observed comparative differences in 
direct expense for Santa Fe and Southern Pacific passenger 
service can be summarized in the following statements. The 
Santa Fe decreased gross ton miles only moderately (compared 
to the Southern Pacific decision) and increased average train 
speed. Output levels were maintained during the 1960's in 
the face or Southern Pacific's continued decreases. 
Compared with the Southern Pacific, the Santa Fe: con-
sistently ran longer trains at faster speeds; placed more 
emphasis on passenger carrying oars (rather than head-end 
oars); continued to re-equip its major trains with more 
efficient equipment; and advertised its service extensive!~ 
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In addition, each railroad produced ite passenger ser-
vice in conjunction with a freight service whose expense 
trends differed substantially from that of the other road. 
Santa Fe's total freight service expense was less than Sou-
thern Pacific's in dollar terms and increased less rapidly 
over time. Although Santa Fe's per unit freight expenses 
were greater than the Southern Pacific's for all years 
studied, the rate of increase over time was less for the 
Santa Fe than for the Southern Pacific. 
In summary, the Santa Fe maintained passenger service 
output--and expenses of this service--within the enviornment 
of a freight operation whose total and per unit expenses 
were increasing at only a moderate rate. The Southern 
Pacific, on the other hand, with rapidly rising freight 
expenses trimmed passenger service expenses sharply by 
reducing passenger service output rapidly. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF RAIL 
PASSENGER MANAGEMENT 
The data developed and discussed in previous·chapters 
present a strong case showing why Santa Fe continues the 
passenger business while the Southern Pacific does not. 
However, while the data reveal much and explain much, some-
thing must also be said about the management of each road 
and how it feels subjectively about the rail passenger 
business. 
Certainly management's subjective view of passenger 
service represents an overlay to, rather than a body apart 
from, the output, revenue, and cost data that is developed 
in this paper. This chapter is written with this in mind. 
Peter F. Drucker has stated that, "the enterprise can 
decide, act, and behave only as its managers do--by itself, 
the enterprise has no effective existence."1 The corpor-
ation, that is, has a personality unique from its competitors 
and reflects the personalities of its managers. This chapter 
assesses, in the author's view, the Santa Fe and Southern 
1Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New 
York, 1954), p. 7. 
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Pacific corporate personalities and compares the ways these 
differences have affected each carrier's commitment to pass-
anger service. 
CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
Everett L. DeGolyer, Jr., rail transportation authority 
and Chairman of the DeGolyer Foundation at Southern Methodist 
University, states that, "Railroads, like people, ·have always 
seemed to me to have character. Certainly, the Southern 
Pacific and Santa Fe have more than most. 112 This corporate 
personality roots in the enviornment and management of the firm. 
Santa .E.!• The enviornment of each road during its 
formative years exerted a strong influence upon the roads' 
managements and their view of "what the business was." The 
Santa Fe began operations in Kansas in 1869 (and somewhat 
later than the Southern Pacific) on a highly local scale. 
It was heavily dependent upon the communities along its 
route for its survival and, indeed, played a key role in 
building many of these towns.3 The Santa Fe was active in 
colonization during the 1880-1890 decade and maintained offices 
in Europe for the purpose of bringing settlers to locate along 
its rails via chartered ship and free rail transportation. 4 
2Letter to the author from E.L. DeGolyer, Jr., February 
19, 1968. 
3James Marshall, Santa Fe, The Railroad That Built an 
.Empire (New York, 1945), pp.-S-1-97)." ---- --
4L.L. Waters, Steel Trails 12, Santa E.! (Lawrence, 1950), 
p. 233. 
, , 8 
Furthermore, the Santa Fe's building and colonizing 
efforts were conducted in an atmosphere of competition from 
other roads that was not present during Southern Pacific's 
early years. 
Southern Pacific. The Southern Pacific began as a 
combination of the Central Pacific portion of the first 
transcontinental railroad with a group of small California 
roads. In its early years, the Southern Pacific was a trans-
port monopoly described by Frank Norris in his novel, The 
Octopus.5 The Southern Pacific's early years were as follows: 
The railroad maintained its control as it had 
won it: through suppression of competition and then 
through the use of economic power, and wide, deep 
political manigulation ••• This control was kept for 
three decades. 
While the Santa Fe had to build its own markets by 
locating people to generate freight traffic, the Southern 
Pacific had a ready market already settled years earlier by 
the gold rush. From the beginning, and by necessity, the 
Santa Fe was more concerned with passenger service than was 
the Southern Pacific. The Santa Fe needed the interest and 
support of communities along its lines to develop markets 
and hold them in the face of competition; the Southern Pacific 
did not. 
Although neither railroad today is highly similar to 
its nineteenth-century image sketched above, the heritage 
5Frank Norris, Ih.! Octopus (Garden City, 1947). 
6Ne111 c. Wilson and Frank J. Taylor, Southern Pacific 
(New York, 1952), p. 45. 
of each carrier should be expected to exert an influence 
upon the present corporate philosophies of the two roads. 
COHPORAT.E PHILOSOPHIES ABOUT 
PASSENGER SERVICE 
11 9 
Statements of passenger service policy are not hard to 
locate in the trade press. Both the Santa Fe and Southern 
Pacific have been moderately vocal in this respect. Although 
such information has been useful to this study--and is quoted 
in its pages--one senses that managements' thinking is more 
concealed, than revealed, in these press releases. 
The obvious recourse is to use the personal interview 
technique with key passenger service officials. The results 
of this tactic were not satisfactory. It makes little 
difference whether the carrier is for, or against, passenger 
service--it is a sensitive topic and few officials contacted 
were willing to discuss it except in general terms. Those 
few officials who did talk and who were willing to be frank 
specified, to a man, that such conversations were "off the 
record." The typical Santa Fe response was ''I have gone 
into this with our Operating, Accounting, and Traffic Depart-
ments and I am sorry to report that none of them feel that 
we can make this confidential, internal information avail-
able. n7 The Southern Pacific's tone was similar when they 
stated, "While I am sympathetic to your needs for your 
7Letter to the author from Bill Burk, manager of 
public relations, Santa Fe Ry., March 24, 1966. 
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thesis on economics, regret that I do not have the type of 
records you desire. "8 
Useful information was found, however, in the record 
of train-off hearings before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and in testimony given before Congressional com-
mittees by officials of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific. 
Consequently, the author's view of the subjective ele-
ments of rail passenger policy are based more on the testi-
mony mentioned above than on the sparse results of inter-
views and correspondence with these officials. 
Managements' subjective view of each carrier towards 
passenger service was formed in full view of certain pass-
enger service trends that were, in general, common to both 
roads.9 Costs were increasing. Inroads of the automobile 
on short-haul and the airlines on the long-haul travel 
caused passenger train revenues to decrease. The optimism 
of the early 1950 period turned to uncertainty during the 
middle of the decade. The Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific 
reacted differently to this uncertainty. 
Santa Fe. Santa Fe chairman E.S. Marsh stated, "We 
have spared no efforts in maintaining the tradition of 
courteous and efficient service for which the Santa Fe 
8tetter to the author from L.G. Crocket, general pass-
enger traffic manager, Southern Pacific Co., January 9, 1967. 
9National Association of Railroad and Utilities Com-
missioners, The Railroad Passenger Deficit Problem (Wash-
ington, 1957r:-p. i. 
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has become so well-known. 1110 John S. Reed, President of 
the same company stated that, "Our policy of being.! leader 
with passenger service remains unchanged.'' 11 The author 
has underlined the key words of these two statements. Chair-
man Marsh stated: 
The great airlines in our territory concen-
trate upon the centers of population at a rel-
atively few places and devote their attention 
to the traffic potential which constitutes the 
cream of the crop. On the other hand, we give 
service as well to the intermediate communities 
along our line. Every taxpayer is footing the 
bill for a Government policy designed to make 
air travel popular by selling the service at pre-
inflationary rates and far below its true cost. 
Is it any wonder that railroad passenger fares 
are also depressed? Is it any wonder that a 
reasonable profit cannot be made by anyone in the 
passenger carrying business?12 
I might say that, between Chicago and Los 
Angeles, where Santa Fe operates, we serve 377 
stations where we are providing passenger ser-
vice, and the population of those 377 is 11,737,000. 
The 3 major airlines that operate in the same ter-
ritory serve 16 stations. The aggregate population 
of those 16 stations is 9,487,000. That is what 
I mean when I say they are concentrating on the 
centers of population. 13 
It is evident from these statements that in 1958, the 
Santa Fe believed that large parts of the passenger travel 
market were untouched by airline competition. Marsh then 
10Letter to the author from E.S. Marsh, Chairman of the 
Santa Fe Railway, August 11, 1966. 
11Letter to the author from J.S. Reed, President of the 
Santa Fe Railway, October 12, 1967. 
12united States Senate. Hearings Before~ Subcommittee 
on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Interstate and 
ForeifSI?: Commerce, January 13-17, 1958 (Washiiigton, 1958,,"""p":"" 401. 
1 3rb1d., p. 385. 
added: 
We don't want to get out of the passenger 
business. We don't want to get out of the mail 
business--we want more mail rather than less. 
Rather than having fewer trains, we would much 
prefer to have more people riding our trains, and 
riding them regularly at rate levels that would 
support the service. We are trying to give the 
best passenger service we kn~w how. We are trying 
to hold on to the business. 1 
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The Santa Fe apparently believed that the communities not 
directly served by airlines constituted a desirable source 
of business. Furthermore,~ the strong points of rail travel, 
as opposed to air travel was viewed as a competitive adv-
antage. For example: 
We are now trying to compete on the basis of 
comfort and convenience and room to move around, 
and a scenic route, and trying to talk to people 
on the basis of going there rather than being 
there.15 
A major inconsistency is evident in this testimony. The 
Santa Fe believes a market for rail travel exists and ex-
presses a strong desire, in word and in deed, to attract 
this market. At the same time, however, this business is 
acknowledged to be a low-profit activity. 
An explanation of this inconsistency undoubtedly rests 
partly with the "traditions of the service." David P. Mor-
gan, editor of Trains magazine stated: 
With better intentions than business acumen, 
no doubt born of a love affair with the stream-
liner dating from 1937, the system obviously 
couldn't bring itself to believe that hi-level 
14Ibid., P• 386. 
15Ibid., p. 397. 
cars and Fred Harvey and TV spots and the magic 
of the very word "Chief" couldn't keep filling 
up Dearbo.rn S}gtion and Los Angeles Union Passen-
ger Terminal. · 
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The Santa Fe's desire for the admittedly low-profit 
passenger business cannot be dismissed with a "traditions 
of the service" argument. The Santa Fe believed that the 
major trains alone were profitable and, if local runs could 
be cut, the expenses avoided would far exceed the revenues 
lost. 17 At the same time, unit costs were reduced on main 
line trains by schedule consolidation and the use of some 
new more efficient equipment. 
Chairman Marsh's desire for more mall traffic quoted 
above from the 1958 senate hearings is yet another explan-
atory component of Santa Fe's passenger service policy. 
While mail has long been an important source of passenger 
train revenue, its relative importance has become more sig-
nificant.18 A given passenger train has a chance for sur-
vival, even if lightly patronized, so long as mail traffic 
can be carried also. However, since mail traffic is a scarce 
good, it must be allocated to those trains which also carry 
at least moderate passenger traffic. 
16navid P. Morgan, Trains, 28 No. 3 (January, 1968), p.4. 
17E.S. Marsh, Railway Age, 150, No. 25 (December 28, 
1964), P• 26. 
18The State Corporation Commission of Kansas. Aepll-
cation of The Atchison, Topeka,~ Santa .[2. Railwayompany 
for autnoritY' to discontinue the operation of Motor Trains 
iiuinbered .ill ancI fil between Newton, Kansasand n6a~e City, Kansas. Docket No. 70,317-R, March 26, 1963, p. 5. 
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By removing mall-carrying trains on which the passen-
ger travel had largely dlsappeared--and then allocating the 
mall to those schedules still used by travelers, these 
latter trains could be justified and promoted as a profit-
able undertaking@ This was the Santa Fe view in a brief 
submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission: 
Notwithstanding the fact that each year since 
1957 the carriers have realized an increase in 
the operati.ng :revenues earned by trains 5 and 6, 
and have substantially reduced the out-of-pocket 
losses of the trains each year since 1957, there 
has been a steady decline in the number of passen-
gers transported on the trains and in the passenger 
revenues which they have earned, and it appears 
that any increase in total revenues has been due to 
increased earnings accruing from head-end traffic. 19 
In the event of the discontinuance of the trains, 
the carriers propose to provide additional car 
space on their existing trains for the handling of 
mail and express presently handled on trains 5 and 
6. 20 
In summary, the Santa Fe believed in 1958 that there 
were substantial long-haul travelers along its route who 
lived in cities not directly served by airlines. Although 
passenger service profitability had deterioriated during the 
early 1950 decade, the profit trends could be reversed by 
increased efficiency and Judicious allocation of mail and 
express traffic to the more heavily patronized trains. 
The pivotal importance of mail revenues has been made 
19rnterstate Commerce Commission. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Company and Gulf, Colorado! Santa Fe 
Railway Company Discontinuance of Service Between Kansas 
City, Mo., and Houston, Texas. 312 Docket No. 20,925, 
A pr il 27, 1 960, p. 88. 
20 B Ibid., p. 7. 
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apparent by recent developments in Post Office mail policy. 
In September, 1967, the Post Office Department informed 
the Santa Fe that all railway post office cars would be 
discontinued within thirty days and that storage mail would 
henceforth move at substantially lower rates under existing 
freight traffic tariffs. Reaction was swift. On October 2, 
nearly one-half of Santa Fe's Pullman and dining service 
was discontinued. On Oct,ober 6. the Santa Fe announced 
its intention to discontinue fourteen passenger train sch-
edules. Three long~haul schedules would be retained, sub-
l, 
ject to continued patronage. Newly-installed Santa Fe 
president John Reed stated: 
While the validity of .the ICC formula is 
debatable, nevertheless the upward trend of 
deficits is significant. When the full impact 
of the loss of mall revenue becomes effective, 
passenger train losses under any formula will 
be staggering. Santa Fe has not abandoned the 
traveling public--travelers show an increasing 
preference to drive or fly. Furthermore, we 
do not see a reversal of this trend despite 
our best efforts to promote rail passenger 
trave1.21 
In spite of its best efforts to attract rail passengers, 
such traffic became increasingly a by-product of mail and 
express traffic. With its mail traffic lost, Santa Fe at 
last was compelled to abandon its tradition of providing 
passenger service over its major routes. Theoonfidence of 
the early fifties became the hopes of the late fifties. 
These hopes and expectations that passenger declines could 
21state~ent by Santa Fe President J.S. Reed in Trains, 
28 No. 3 (January, 1968), p. 4. 
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be halted evaporated in the sixties. 
Southern Pacific. In 1950, the Southern Pacific was 
strongly committed to passenger service. Over the next sev-
eral years, as automobiles began to take the short haul traf-
fic and the airlines began to take the long haul passengers, 
Southern Pacific passenger train profit vanished. 
Whereas the Santa Fe believed the decline in revenues 
could be halted and profit restored by greater efficiency 
and better allocation of mail traffic, the Southern Pacific 
decided the game was not worth the candle. In 1958, Southern 
Pacific Chairman D.J. Russell stated before a Senate com-
mittee: 
The people of this country are just not using 
trains to go from one place to another as they did 
in years gone by. The private automobile, the air-
plane and the bus have taken the lion's share of 
this business. It does not make good sense to run 
trains at substantial losses when they are lightly 
patronized. On the Southern Pacific we have appre-
ciated and attempted to meet this problem. Obtaining 
permission from State regulatory bodies to permit 
discontinuance of passenger service is often a dif-
ficult and long-drawn-out process. 
We attempted to attract additional passenger 
travel by providing new and splendidly equipped trains 
but found that the patronage did not cover our oper-
ating costs, let alone provide a return on capital 
investment. Where the public does not utilize a 
train, it is our view that the unprofitable operation 
should not be continued at the ultimate expense of 
our other patrons. On the Southern Pacific we are 
making every effort to meet this serious problem as 
best we can within the framework of present law and 
regulation.22 · 
22united States Senate. Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Surface Transportation or tbe Committee on Inter-
state affii Foreign Commerce, January T37 1'7, 1958 (Washing-
ton, 1'958'), p. 592. 
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In the Southern Pacific view, the passenger train issue 
had already been decided by 1958. The company's past efforts 
had failed to make passenger service profitable. 
The Southern Pacific, unlike the Santa Fe, saw no pass-
enger potential from the local stations along its route. 
While Santa Fe's Marsh was speaking of the "377 stations 
along our route," as a source of passengers, Southern Pa-
cific's Russell was telling the same Senate sub-committee, 
We are proceeding actively with the closing 
and consolidation of unnecessary stations and 
agencies. Originally, prior to the motor age, 
stations were established a few miles apart to 
serve the needs of shippers. With today's rapid 
travel and communications, many of these are not 
needed and, in fact service to the public is 
improved by consolidations at central points. 23 
Under the guidance of Chairman Russell, the Southern 
Pacific moved actively toward being a freight-only carrier. 
These actions were not limited to attempts to discontinue 
unpatronized trains. Testimony given to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission indicates that the Southern Pacific 
actively discouraged patronage on well-traveled trains. 
Practically every witness appearing to object to 
the proposed discontinuances criticized the petition-
er's overall attitude towards passenger service, and 
charged that during recent years the petitioner had 
deliberately attempted to destroy the usefulness of 
its trains and to discourage passenger patronage.24 
23Ibid. 
24 rnterstate Commerce Commission. Southern Pacific 
Company fartial Discontinuance of Passenger Trains Between 
Los Angeles and Sacramento; Oakland and Sacramento; and 
San Francisco and San Jose, Calif. 320 Docket No. 503, 
Ju!y 21, 1960,--r:>: 15: ----
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In 1962, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission 
of Nevada found that, 
••• scheduled arrival and departure times of 
trains are at inconvenient hours, and the ser-
vice has declined with respect to such matters 
as cleanliness of the cars and the lack of 
drinking water and paper towels.25 
In 1963, protestants before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission contended that, 
• • • the car.rier has deserted the public and ·by 
failure to provide an attractive service, to 
advertise, and to operate on time it has actively 
discouraged use of these trains. They operate 
trains with dirty floors, seats, and windows. 
Furthermore, train 6 is delayed for freight move-
ments ca~ging it to miss connections at New 
Orleans. 
There is also evidence that the Southern Pacific has 
attempted to increase expenses of its passenger trains as 
well as reduce revenues. For example, the California Pub-
lie Utilities Commission found that Southern Pacific repair 
expense for both passenger locomotives and passenger cars 
was approximately twenty-five percent above that of the 
other western railroads. 27 
The Southern Pacific's aggressive attempts to eliminate 
all long-haul passenger service have been met with increasing 
25Ibid •. Southern Pacific Company Discontinuance of Pas-
senger Trains Nos. 27 and 28 Between Ogd6n, Utah, and Oakland, Calif. 317 Docket No':'" 2T;°946, July 6, 19 2, p. 541:--
26Ibid. Southern Pacific Company Discontinuance of~-
senger Trains~· 2 ~ 6 Between~ Orleans, La.,!!!£ !:i.9J:!.!:!,-
ton, Tex. 320 Docket No. 22,567, Sept. 12, s963, p. 313. 
27rbid. Southern Pacific Company Partial Discontinuance 
of Passenger Service, San Francisco, Oakland, Calif.-Portland, 
Oregon. 320 Docket No. 22,905, May 14, 1964, p. 753. 
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opposition as time passes. In 1967, the state regulatory 
authorities of California, Arizona., New Mexico, Texas and 
Louisiana asked the Interstate Commerce Commiss1.on to force 
Southern Pacific to restore the quality of service on some 
of its trains. These states accused the Southern Pacific 
of deliberately driving passengers away as a prelude to 
I 
asking Interstate Commerce Commission approval to discon-
tinue trains. These states further contended that Southern 
Pacific does not accept reservations at some points along 
its route and that some passenger trains are not even listed 
in the carrier's public timetables.28 
In fact, the Southern Pacific has been promoting air 
travel actively in its adV"ertising. 1.h£ lifil Street Journal 
reports that, 
For one thing the road has taken out ads 
detailing the savings in time and money for the 
man who takes the airplane. ("The Lark: What 
future is there for a bird that can't fly?u asked 
one ad. The answer: None.) For another, the 
railroad company has made the trip unappealing, 
critics claim. (The only thing tougher than the 
steak on the Lark, asserts Mr. Freberg, "was 
the heart of the Southern Pacific ticket agent who 
booked me.")29 
If the Interstate Commerce Commission does order the 
Southern Pacific to restore the quality of service, and if 
the order is upheld under appeal, the Southern Pacific will 
28wayne E. Green, "Can the ICC Say How to Run a Rail-
road? Issue is Raised by Southern Pacific Case," lli1. 
Street Journal, December 20, 1967 p. 22. 
29charles E. Alverson, "Deriding the Rails: Road 
Praises Airlines in a Bid to Drop Train," ~ Street Journal, 
June 1, 1966, p. 1. 
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be forced to lower the expenses and increase the revenues 
of its service. Carriers still in the passenger business 
will find they are unable to cut back such service any 
further. The effects of such a turning point in Interstate 
Commerce Commission policy were summarized by Chairman Ben 
W. Heineman, of the Chicago and North Western Railroad. He 
replied that, "We did not think we could get out of the 
business--politically it was impossible, and it would have 
caused too much 111 will. Since we were going to stay in 
the business, we concluded we should run it as well as 
possible." 30 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter ls to discuss--apart from 
the statistical data--the nature of each railroad's passenger 
service policy. This separate discussion is necessary 
because the data itself presents an incomplete picture of 
the nature of this policy. 
In 1950, both the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific were 
strongly committed to passenger service. During the middle 
of the 1950 decade, while the Santa Fe held fast to its exis-
ting policy, the Southern Pacific moved rapidly from a pro-
passenger to an anti-passenger railroad. After the middle 
1950' s, the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific passenger service 
30un1ted States House of Representatives. Hearings 
Before The Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics 
of The Cciiiimittee on Interstate and Foreign--COmmerce. April 
~,~; May 8, 19o7'. (washingtoii;-1967), p. 45. 
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policies diverged further. 
Although the causes of this increasing policy divergence 
can be tied to factors of tradition, community service and 
some differences in the markets served by each carrier, the 
real cause of the policy split was the carriers' reactions 
to airline competition. 
While the Santa Fe believed air competition--at least in 
1958--of significance only in the major cities, the Southern 
Pacific took a broader view. In the view of the latter road, 
the potential passengers left over from the airlines and 
other modes of travel were not worth bothering with. 
Through 1965, each road aggressively pursued its chosen 
passenger service policy. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The first task of this chapter is to determine whether 
Santa Fe's passenger service optimism is backed by passenger 
service profits and whether Southern Pacific's pessimism is 
backed by passenger service losses. With the background of 
output, revenue, and expense data developed in previous 
chapters, the sources of passenger service profits and losses 
are explored to provide insight into the reasons why one 
road is optimistic about this service while the other is not. 
Because passenger service is produced by both carriers 
within the environment of multiproduct operation, a compar-
ison of Santa Fe and Southern Pacific overall profitability 
(freight plus passenger) provides pivotal conclusions about 
the two carriers' differing passenger service policies. 
Efficiency in overall plant operation develops further 
insights into the two carriers' divergent passenger service 
policies. The duPont ratio method of calculating rate of 
return on investment is broken down into its component ratios 
for the purpose of developing efficiency comparisons. 
Finally, and after Santa Fe and Southern Pacific profit-
ability and efficiency have been summarized, the author's 
conclusions are offered as to why the Santa Fe was optimistic 
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about passenger service during the 1950-1965 period while 
the Southern Pacific became increasingly pessimistic. 
PASSENGER SERVICE PROFITABILITY 
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Santa .E!!• On an avoidable cost basis, the Santa Fe's 
passenger service has been generally profitable over the 
1950-1965 span. Revenues exceeded directly related expenses 
for all years except 1954-1958 and 1965 (Table 22). Further-
more, the data in Table 22 indicate that during the 1950-
1965 period, revenues from passenger service have exceeded 
direct expenses of this service by slightly more than $42 
million, or an average annual profit of $2.63 million. 
Southern Pacific. Passenger operations of this carrier, 
by comparison, have been generally unprofitable between 1950 
and 1965. The Southern Pacific experienced rather sizable 
passenger service losses every year between 1954 and 1961 
(Table 22). Over the 1950-1965 span, total passenger service 
revenues failed to cover direct expenses by $2.35 million, 
an average annual loss of nearly $150 thousand. 
Explanation of trends. Santa Fe passenger service 
revenue has been maintained over the period studied, whereas 
Southern Pacific's passenger revenues have decreased. It is 
impossible to determine whether, in each case, the passen-
gers have deserted the railroads or .Y...!..£2 versa. A few obser-
vations are possible however. The Santa Fe continued to 
maintain its service both in quantity and quality over the 
1950-1965 period and promoted this service heavily at the 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 22 
PASSENGER SERVICE PROFIT.ABILITY: SANTA FE AND 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS, 1950 - 1965* 
Santa 
Fe 
:l 18, 005 
7,279 
12,217 
(x 1000) 
13, 537 
4,039 Loss 
1 ,041 Loss 
8,396 Loss 
9.779 Loss 
2,248 Loss 
834 
407 
7,162 
6,229 
2,245 
499 
840 Loss 
Southern 
Pacific 
$21,970 
17, 119 
18, 186 
6, 711 
5,091 Loss 
13,319 Loss 
16,420 Loss 
15,622 Loss 
10,748 Loss 
8, 341 Loss 
7,186 Loss 
5,579 Loss 
5,689 
2,429 
4,748 
3,073 
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*Profitability is calculated as the excess of operating rev-
enues over directly related operating expenses. 
Source: Annual Report of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railway Co. to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
(Washington,-"f950-1965). 
Ibid.,~ Southern Pacific Company. 
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same time by advertising, travel plans and tourist side trips. 
The Southern Pacific's passenger operations were reduced 
over this time both in quantity and quality. Little new 
equipment was installed; dining and Pullman services were 
curtailed; and this carrier decreased its sales promotion 
rapidly. Passenger related revenue is a slightly more impor-
tant component of P.& A.S. revenue for the Southern Pacific 
than for the Santa Fe. For this reason, a given decrease in 
passenger related revenue would affect Southern Pacific's 
P.& A.S. revenue more significantly than it would the Santa 
Fe's. 
Santa Fe's direct expense related to passenger service 
has increased over the 1950-1965 period. This increase is, 
aside from the influences of inflation, traced to Santa Fe's 
continued modernization of its passenger equipment as well 
as its continued high output levels. In comparison, 
Southern Pacific's direct expense has decreased substantially 
over the same period. The Southern Pacific policies of 
service elimination and capital consumption compared with 
Santa Fe's periodic equipment modernization and stabilized 
output levels explain the comparative differences between 
the two carriers' total direct P.& A.S. expense. In the 
total direct expense per gross ton mile statistics, the 
Santa Fe expense is significantly less than the Southern 
Pacific's suggesting more efficient operation by the former 
road. 
Profit oriented differences _!a passenger policy. Table 
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22 illustrates the fact that both Santa Fe and Southern 
Pacific passenger service experienced losses beginning in 
1954. However, the Santa Fe losses were neither as severe 
nor as persistent as the Southern Pacific's passenger 
deficit. These data, coupled with the separate revenue and 
expense data trends discussed in previous chapters support 
the thesis that Santa Fe attacked its passenger deficit by 
increasing expenditures and promotion while Southern Pacific 
eliminated its deficit by reducing expenses and service 
promotion sharply. 
However, passenger service obviously is not produced in 
a vacuum by either railroad. When compared to the Southern 
Pacific, the Santa Fe's freight service was found to have 
faster, shorter, higher unit-revenue trains that at the 
same time compare favorably with Southern Pacific's freight 
operation in expense of operations. However, the really 
meaningful insights into whether either railroad can afford 
to support a passenger service are not apparent when freight 
service and passenger service operations are~ compared 
separately. The crucial comparisons must be made in terms 
of overall efficiency. These comparisons will now be made. 
OVERALL PROFITABILITY 
Santa Fe. This road's net income after taxes was $82 
million in 1950. This net decreased in an erratic fashion 
to a 1960 low of $51 million and increased almost steadily 
thereafter to nearly $82 million in 1965 (Table 23). 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1 961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 23 
NET INCOME AFTER TAXES SANTA FE AND 
SOU 1rHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
Santa 
Fe 
tt,82,142 
73,346 
70, T38 
77, 186 
66, 173 
Tr, 565 
70, 21 3 
61 '91+2 
67,235 
65,786 
51,597 
54·, 850 
70,692 
67,501 
75,780 
81,619 
1950 - 1965 
( x 1000) 
Southern 
Pacific 
$50 ,839 
46,019 
61,942 
57,922 
~A-, 355 
51, 645 
46,462 
46,645 
47 ,051 
49, 20 3 
47,445 
54,552 
60, 783 
67 ,053 
63, 898 
69,677 
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Source: Annual Report of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railwa Co. toTheinterstate CommerceCommission';' 
Washington,-r950-1965). 
Ibid., The Southern Pacific Company. 
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Southern Pacific. The net income of this carrier was 
less than the Santa Fe's for all years studied. However, 
Southern Pacific's net has increased in a steady fashion 
over time. From nearly $51 million in 1950, this road's net 
decreased to a 1954 low of $44 million and climbed there-
after to nearly $70 million in 1965 (Table 23). 
It is significant to note that in 1954 when Southern 
Pacific experienced a very low net income from overall oper-
ations, their passenger service loss was almost $5 million. 
It is also important to note that Southern Pacific's pass-
enger service output began to decrease sharply during this 
time. 
OPERATING EFFICIENCY 
An examination of how efficiently each railroad gener-
ated its net income is of equal importance with the compar-
ison of their income data. Table 24 summarizes such compar-
ative efficiency data. 
Operatin5 ratio. This statistic expresses operating 
expenses of each railroad's output (freight plus passenger) 
as a percent of operating revenue. Santa Fe operating 
expenses varied between 67 and nearly 78 percent of opera-
ting revenues from 1950 through 1960. Over the same period 
the Southern Pacific operating ratio was greater for all 
years, fluctuating between 73 and nearly 81 percent (Table 
24). After 1960, the Santa Fe experienced higher operating 
ratios--from nearly 79 to 81 percent--than did the Southern 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 24 
SELECTED MEASUREMENTS OF OVERALL E.r"FICIENCY 
SANTA FE .AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROADS 
1950 - 1965 
tYperating ratio* ~··· Operating revenues-· Net -inc-om·e-.;. 
f total assets operating revenues 
Santa Southern Santa Southern Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific Fe Pacific Fe Pacific 
73.33% 73.10% 38% 37% 16% 8% 
67.48 77. 10 41 39 1 3 7 
73.49 74.24 41 40 12 9 
68.48 76.oo 41 39 1 3 8 
75.15 78.96 36 35 12 7 
73.27 79.33 38 37 1 3 8 
73.88 80.86 38 36 12 7 I 
77.06 80. 20 39 34 10 7 I 
77. 70 80.07 38 33 1 1 7 
72.62 78.22 40 34 10 7 
77. 20 79. 11 38 33 8 7 
78.55 77. 38 37 30 9 8 
78.29 78. 18 37 30 1 2 9 
79.22 78.53 37 30 1 1 10 
79.93 79.92 37 30 12 9 
80.90 77.80 37 33 12 9 
Rate of return 
on investment 
Santa Southern 
Fe Pacific 
6.08% 2.96% 
5.33 2.73 
4.92 3.60 
5.33 3.12 
4.32 2.45 
4.94 2.96 
4.56 2.52 
3.90 2. 38 
!+. 18 2. 31 
4.00 2. 38 
3.04 2. 31 
3.33 2.40 
4.44 2.70 
4.07 3.00 
1.1-. 44 .2.70 
4.11-4 2. 9'! 
""Operating expenses as a percent of operating revenues. 
Source: Annual Report of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co. to The 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (Washington, 195o=T965). - - -
Ibid., The Sout.h~rn Pacific Company. 
..... 
vJ 
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Pacific--77 to nearly 80 percent (Table 24). Santa Fe's 
sixteen year avera~e operating ratio, however, was lower 
than the Southern Pacific's--75.41 percent compared to 78.06 
percent. 
Operating revenues per asset dollar. This statistic 
measures each road's ability to use its assets to generate 
gross revenue. Effective use of assets, in this sense, 
would result in a high ratio. Table 24 shows that Santa Fe 
used its assets more effectively than did the Southern 
Pacific for every year studied. In a comparative sense, 
this effectiveness has increased as the spread between the 
two roads' ratios has widened over time (Table 24). 
Net income per gross revenue dollar. This ratio meas-
ures each carrier's ability to convert gross revenue into 
net income after taxes. A high ratio indicates that the 
gross revenue was generated with relatively low expenses. 
This statistic gives a somewhat more useful view of the 
road's operations than does the operating ratio, for it 
includes non-operating expenses such as interest on borrowed 
funds and depreciation. 
Santa Fe's net income has been a larger percent of 
gross revenue than the Southern Pacific's for all years 
researched (Table 24). In fact, the Santa Fe has been able 
to generate from 25 to 50 percent more net income per dol-
lar's gross revenue than has the Southern Pacific (Table 24). 
The two ratios just discussed support a conclusion that 
the Santa Fe has been the more efficiently operated road. 
A marginal passenger operation would burden the Santa F'e 
less than the Southern Pacific. 
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The duPont ratio. The two preceeding ratios, when 
combined, result in the duPont ratio method of calculating 
the rate of return on investment. Assuming that total assets 
as reported in the balance sheet of each road ls equivalent 
to total investment in the business, multiplication of the 
two previous ratios gives the same results as dividing net 
income by total investment. 
Santa Fe's rate of return on investment decreased from 
a 1950 high of 6.08 percent to a low of 3.04 percent in 
1960. After that year, this road's return on investment 
increased to 4.44 percent in 1965 (Table 24). 
Southern Pacific's rate of return was less than Santa 
Fe's for all years studied--considerably so. Furthermore, 
there was little annual fluctuation between this road's 2.96 
percent return in 1950 and its 2.97 percent return in 1965 
(Table 24). When one considers that the Southern Pacific 
has more debt--and leverage--than the Santa Fe, the Southern 
Pacific's lower rate of return is striking. 1 
SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF POLICY 
DETERMINATION 
Non-measurable benefits of Eassenger service. Although 
the data strongly support the divergent passenger service 
111 The Southern Pacific Company," Forbes, 96, No. 9 
(November 1, 1965), pp. 25-26. 
policies of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific, there are 
other possible reasons for these divergent policies which--
although unmeasurable--are mentioned for the reader to 
ponder. 
Perhaps Santa Fe management likes to run passenger 
trains. It is well known that the Santa Fe has placed the 
accumulation of cash and a stabilized position in a higher 
priority than r_apid growth via the leverage of externally 
generated funds~2 The Santa Fe can better afford to indulge 
in the subjective pleasures of operating passenger service 
than can the Southern Pacific, and the cold eye of the 
accountant has no place in this subjective "cost11 and 11 bene-
fit" calculation. The costs and benefits are subjectively 
determined and are a luxury the debt-heavy, low-return 
Southern Pacific can 111 afford. Whether the Santa Fe can 
afford this luxury is indeterminate; suffice to say that it 
can better afford this subjectivity than can the Southern 
Pacific. 
Attraction ..Q.f. shippers BI, 5ood passenger operations. 
One often hears that a "showcase" passenger operation serves 
the railroad by creating an image of similar "first-rate" 
freight service. Evidence is contained in two "train-off11 
hearings held at the behest of the Santa Fe in an attempt to 
remove two different local passenger trains. In both oases, 
major freight shippers along each train's route were heard. 
2Ibid., p. 126. 
Both passenger tr•ains were calculated to lose money on an 
avoidable cost basis.3 
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"Subsidization" of losing passenger service via higher 
freight rates was a central theme of the testimony in both 
cases. In one case, the local -shippers were unwilling to 
subsidize, in their opinion, a losing passenger operation. 
In the other case, the major shippers were entirely willing 
to help support their passenger service. In the former case, 
the train was removed; the latter train remained in opera-
tion until the Santa Fe went to higher authority. The mere 
existence of such service implies no necessary image of 
"showcase 11 freight service in the shipper's mind. 
Deliberate inefficiencies. If a railroad, say the 
Southern Pacific, decided to remove passenger service entirely 
--and if this removal depended upon demonstrated massive 
losses as it must before most regulatory commissions--it is 
obviously possible for the railroad to "expense" a service 
into extinction. Borts' conclusion that railways 11 ••• do not 
produce on their envelope curves" is certainly true under 
such an assumption.4 
3The State Corporation Commission of Kansas. Appli-
cation of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe BI.•££• for 
authority to Discontinue Operatioris of Trains No. 311-312, 
Docket 71,'8DO-R, June 15, 1964. ~ ~ 
The State Corporation Commission of New Mexico. Petition 
of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Bz· Co. to Discontinue 
Tra'Ins 11£· 25-26. Docketlfo. 34,87"8', October-i-7, 1965. 
4oeorge H. Borts, "Increasing Returns in the Railway 
Industry, 11 Journal .Q.f. Political Economy, 62 (1954), pp. 316 
and 333. 
Also obvious is the ability of any firm to reduce its 
revenues by eliminating advertising and reducing quality. 
These assumptions of artificial expenses and discouragement 
of customers are impossible to analyze in the absence of 
engineering cost estimates and detailed investigation. The 
point, however, warrants mention in this study. 
Service in the nublic interest. A final variable in 
~ -'~~- -~~~-
management's passenger decision--in addition to the data-
oriented and more subjective variables--is the railroad's 
view of its status as a public utility. 
The Santa Fe operates small depot agencies along most 
of its lines where the prospect of any business is evident. 
Most local shippers are able to communicate with a local 
Santa Fe agent. The Southern Pacific, however, maintains 
few depot agencies except in major traffic centers. A local 
shipper must communicate long distance in such instances. 
In other words, while the Southern Pacific is in the 
communities along its lines, the Santa Fe in a comparative 
sense is both in and of the communities it serves. Southern 
Pacific historian Guy Dunscomb states that the Southern 
Pacific serves the big shippers and lets the business from 
the small shippers and from passengers drift unattended 
where it may.5 
When does a railroad's rights of private enterprise 
end and its public utility responsibility begin? By 
5Letter to the author from G.L. Dunscomb, Southern 
Pacific historian, October 28, 1967. 
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eomparison, the Santa Fe appears to give more weight to the 
oublic utility responsibility than does the Southern Pacific. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The increasingly divergent passenger policies of 
the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroads are supported 
by passenger service profit and loss data. The Santa Fe's 
passenger service has been generally more profitable than 
the Southern Pacific's. Santa Fe's annual losses in the 
mid-1950's were less than Southern Pacific's and were elim-
inated sooner than the latter road's deficits. 
The Santa Fe, with comparatively small losses between 
1954 and 1958, elected to stay in the market and fight the 
deficits with equipment, sales, and promotional innovation. 
The Southern Pacific, with the larger passenger service 
deficits during the same years, decided to phase out pass-
enger service entirely and employed the "deliberate ineffic-
iencies" technique to implement its decision. No other 
reason is apparent to the author to explain the Southern 
Pacific's lower efficiency ratios. 
2. Santa Fe's longer-haul, higher average revenue 
passenger versus Southern Pacific's shorter-haul, low 
revenue average passenger characteristics reinforced each 
carrier's decision about passenger service. Commuter service 
impeded the Southern Pacific, but not the Santa Fe. As 
the Southern Pacific decreased its long-haul passenger 
business, it became increasingly tied to and concerned with 
this suburban local passenger service. 
3. The characteristics of each road's freight oper-
ations influenced and reinforced their separate passenger 
service decisions. The Santa Fe, operating with short, 
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fast, high-revenue freights was more adaptable to the oper-
ation of fast passenger trains than was the Southern Pacific, 
which traditionally favored long, slow and infrequent freight 
trains. 
4. Comparison of each road's overall profitability 
supports the conclusion that the Santa Fe could afford to 
continue with a positive passenger service policy and wait 
to see the results of this aggressive promotion on pass-
enger service profits. The Southern Pacific could not 
afford to wait. Compared to the Santa Fe, the Southern 
Pacific was less profitable, less efficient, and debt-
heavy. Even if Southern Pacific's passenger service profits 
had matched Santa Fe's increasingly marginal performance, 
any course of action other than the one chosen by Southern 
Pacif1c--1n view of its apparent decision to totally elim-
inate passenger service--would not have made sense. The 
Southern Pacific was sub-standard--in profits, efficiency 
and debt structure--when compared with its bitter rival, 
the Santa Fe. 
The Southern Pacific had to grow and improve its posi-
tion. It could not afford the financial drag of an unwanted 
submarginal passenger operation. 
5. Subjective elements of passenger service policy 
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are evident in both railroad's policies. The conclusion 
of the author ls that the Santa Fe weighed the '' showcase" 
and "tradition'' benefits of passenger service rather heavily 
while the Southern Pacific did not. The former road could 
afford to do this while the latter road could not. 
In a comparative sense, the Santa Fe incorporated more 
of the ''public service" philosophy and less of the ''deliberate 
inefficiencies" philosophy than did the Southern Pacific. 
Explanation of this difference once again can be traced to 
Santa Fe's better financial position and performance. 
6. Finally, and in the author's opinion most import-
antly, the increasingly divergent passenger service policies 
of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific can be traced to their 
separate--and different--reactions to airline competition. 
Between 1950 and 1965 both railroads had to make at 
least one major long-run decision--whether to buy new equip-
ment for the major trains or eliminate the service as fast 
as possible. This decision was made by each carrier some-
time during the 1955-1957 period. 
The Santa Fe view that airline competition existed for 
the most part only in major cities resulted in its decision 
to re-equip and continue in the passenger business. Southern 
Pacific's view that airlines would eventually gain all the 
desirable long-haul business prompted it to phase out pass-
enger service as quickly as possible. 
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